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ECONOMIC BENEFIT DOCTRINE
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INTRODUCTION

I.R.C. § 4462 permits taxpayers to compute taxable income by
using the accounting method regularly used to keep their business
books.' The cash method of accounting is the simplest method
because it permits taxpayers to use the deposit slips and check
records from their checking account to keep track of taxable income and deductions. 4 For cash basis taxpayers, income is reported when payments are actually or constructively received and
deductions are taken only when payment is actually made.5
Because taxpayers have the power to postpone the receipt of
cash, three doctrines 6 have developed that require immediate income recognition even though actual receipt has not occurred.
First, the constructive receipt doctrine requires a cash-method taxpayer to report income if the taxpayer has the power to obtain payment.7 Second, the cash equivalence doctrine requires that a cash
basis taxpayer report income if he receives an asset that he can
readily convert into cash, such as a negotiable promissory note of
the obligor.' Third, the economic benefit doctrine applies when
the transaction is structured so that the taxpayer recognizes income when he is economically benefited even though he does not
have power to obtain immediate payment.9 In its simplest form,
the economic benefit doctrine is applicable when the right to the
future cash payment is nonforfeitable and the payment is funded
2 See I.R.C. § 446 (a) (1986). References to "section" numbers refer to sections in
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
3 The concept underlying the rule is that the taxpayer's business books are intended to give the taxpayer an accurate and realistic picture of the business'
performance.
4 See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, §11, at 233 (7th ed.

1994).
5 See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1993). There is no doctrine of
constructive payment allowing deductions for expenses prior to payment.
6 See Ridgeley A. Scott, Rabbis and Other Top Hats: The Great Escape, 43 CATH. U.L.
REv. 1, 16 (1993) (describing the development of the doctrines beginning with the
1913 Revenue Act).
7 See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (as amended in 1993).
8 See Scott, supra note 6, at 35. Scott stated the following:
Cash equivalence is similar to constructive receipt in that both doctrines
are premised on a reasonable opportunity to obtain payment. Income
may be constructively received where there is a right to obtain actual
possession of an item of income, while a promise may be the equivalent
of cash if it can be converted into money by a disposition. One method
of conversion is discounting to a financial institution.
Id.
9 See Scott, supra note 6,at 16-17. The economic benefit rule originated in an
attempt by the treasury to tax benefits such as health and life insurance coverage. See
id. at 17.
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or set aside for future payment.1 ° The economic benefit doctrine
is often misunderstood, misapplied, and even ignored as a separate
doctrine.1 1
If the economic benefit doctrine is applied broadly, any right
to future payment could be taxed presently because the taxpayer is
"better off," thereby eliminating the distinction between the cash
and accrual methods of accounting. If applied narrowly, the economic benefit doctrine merges with the other two doctrines and
allows the taxpayer overly broad discretion in selecting the year of
taxation.
For example, in Reed v. Commissioner2 a taxpayer deferred receipt of cash for seven days by placing the purchase price for the
sale of stock into an escrow account to be paid out during the next
tax year. Childs v. Commissioner3 is another instance where the doctrine was narrowly applied. 4 In Childs, attorneys (taxpayers) representing tort claimants agreed to accept their fees over an extended
period of time as part of a structured settlement.1 5 The Tax Commissioner (the Commissioner) ruled that the taxpayers had to report the present value of future payments in income in the year of
settlement.' 6 The taxpayers argued that because they had no right
to immediate payment, the fees should be reported when received. 17 The Tax Court agreed and allowed the attorneys wide
latitude in structuring a deferred compensation arrangement without adhering to any of the complex rules normally governing such
plans.' 8
The latitude afforded to the taxpayers in Reed and Childs constitutes an abuse of the cash method of accounting. Under I.R.C.
§ 446(b),' 9 the Commissioner may challenge accounting methods
10 For example, the future cash payment may be set aside in an escrow or trust
account.
11 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
12 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983), revg 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 398 (1982).
'3 103 T.C. 634 (1994), aff'd per curiamz, 89 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1996).
14 See id. at 653.
15 See id. at 642.
16 See id. at 647.
17 See id. at 652.
18 See Childs, 103 T.C. at 655.
19 See I.R.C. § 446(b) (1986) stating:
If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or
if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of
taxable income shall be made under such methods as, in the opinion of
the Secretary, does clearly reflect income.
The Internal Revenue Code does not define "clearly reflect income" and cases deal
with this phrase on an individual basis.
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that do not clearly reflect income. If properly applied, however,
the "economic benefit" doctrine could prevent such abuses20 and
allow taxpayers flexibility to minimize their taxes and preserve the
simplicity of the cash method of accounting. Because taxpayers
construct complex transactions to take advantage of the cash
method's simplicity, the economic benefit doctrine performs a valuable service in limiting such transactions.
This article will examine the "economic benefit" doctrine and
discuss how its overly narrow application allows taxpayers to abuse
the cash method of accounting. The author recognizes that rules
applying to the cash method of accounting also impact scenarios
covered by specific code sections.21 This article, in turn, will only
address those situations where such sections do not apply.
Part II A will layout for the general reader the concepts underlying the three major income recognition doctrines. Part II B will
explain how decisions such as Reed and Childs have misapplied the
economic benefit doctrine. Part II C will demonstrate how a consistent definition and application of the economic benefit doctrine
is consistent with a number of long-standing tax rules. Part II C
will also suggest how other tax rules may be used to limit the deferral abuses of the cash method of accounting.
II.

TAx

ACCOUNTING

I.R.C. § 446(c) acknowledges that taxpayers are permitted to
compute taxable income under the cash and accrual methods of
accounting. 22 For cash basis taxpayers, income is reported when
20 See STEPHEN F. GERTZMAN, FEDERAL TAX AccouNTING § 3.03(1) (a), at 3-13 (2d

ed. 1993). The author notes that the confusion and uncertainty in determining when
an item of income should be taxed results from: "(1) a desire to achieve the benefits
of the cash method and (2) the fact that certain provisions of the Code and Treasury
Regulations attempt to delineate 'items' of income while other provisions attempt to
regulate when those items should be recognized." Id.
21 See I.R.C. §§ 83, 453 (1986). Deferred payment sales of property are covered by
the installment sale provisions of I.R.C. § 453 which does not consider purchaser obligations as payment unless readily marketable. See I.R.C. § 453(f) (4) (b) (1986); see also
BoRis I. BrrTER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND

Gwrs, 106-7, 106-8 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that an obligation of a third person is payment regardless of its form or negotiability).
Transfers of "property" in payment of services (including services as an employee) are covered by I.R.C. § 83, which excludes unfunded and unsecured promises
to pay from the definition of property and requires inclusion for property that is
transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. See I.R.C. § 83(a) (1986);
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(b) (as amended in 1985).
22 See I.R.C. § 446(c) (1986). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may challenge
accounting methods if there are indications that income has not been clearly re-
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payments are actually or constructively received and deductions
are taken only when payment is made. 2 ' There is no doctrine of
constructive payment allowing deductions for expenses prior to
payment.
For the accrual-method taxpayer, income and deductions are
reported when the "all-events" test is met. 24 On the income recognition side, the "all-events" test requires that income be reported
before payment is received, if all events have occurred that fix the
taxpayer's right to receive the income and if the amount of the
income can be determined with reasonable accuracy. 25 On the deduction side, however, the additional requirement of economic
performance prevents the accrual of deductions in advance of in26
curring the economic impact of the liability.
The cash and accrual methods tend to converge on both the
deduction and income side.2 7 On the deduction side, the economic performance requirement tends to defer deductions until
they are paid,2 8 thereby forcing accrual-method taxpayers to reflect
cash basis deductions. On the income side, a well-known trilogy of
flected. See Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 87, 92 (1994), affd, 71 F.3d
209, 212 (6th Cir. 1995).
23 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (i) (as amended in 1995). The regulation reads in
part: "Generally, under the cash receipts and disbursements method in the computation of taxable income, all items which constitute gross income (whether in the form
of cash, property, or services) are to be included for the taxable year in which [they
are] actually or constructively received."
Id. (emphasis added). The need for a constructive receipt regulation goes back to the
beginning of the income taxation. See Scott, supra note 6, at 16.
24 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (ii) (as amended in 1995). The "all-events" test was
first announced in United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926).
25 See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-51-1(a) (as amended in 1995).
26 See Treas. Reg. §1.461-1(a) (2) (as amended in 1994). On the deduction side, a
liability is taken into account "in the taxable year in which all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability, the amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy, and economic performance has occurred with
respect to the liability." Id. I.R.C. § 461(h) was enacted in 1984. Prior to I.R.C.
§ 461 (h), accrual-method taxpayers could take deductions for future liabilities when
the fact of liability was established and the amount of the liability could be reasonably
determined. Under this test, taxpayers could take a deduction long before the economic impact of the deduction was incurred. I.R.C. § 461(h) delays the deduction
until the economic impact of the deduction is incurred. For a discussion of I.R.C.
§ 461(h) see Gordon Butler, LR.C. § 461(h): Tax Fairness and the Deduction of Future
Liabilities, 26 U. MEM. L. Rxv. 97 (1995).
27 The Knight-Ridder court oversimplified the difference between the cash and accrual methods of accounting calling the cash method "simple, plodding, elemental"
and the accrual method a "visionary prophet." Knight-Ridder Newspapers v. United
States, 743 F.2d 781, 787 (11th Cir. 1984).
28 See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4 (as amended in 1995). The regulation sets out the
requirements for economic performance with numerous examples where actual payment is required before economic performance occurs. See id.
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cases 29 upheld the Commissioner's assertion that prepaid income
must be included in gross income in the year of receipt even
though the related services will be performed in a subsequent
year.3" The trilogy thereby dilutes the effect of the "all-events" test
and treats accrual-method taxpayers like cash-method taxpayers for
income recognition purposes. Administrative simplicity and a tax
system that affords taxpayers the opportunity to have funds available for payment are policy considerations guiding court decisions.
For the cash-method taxpayer, the overlap of the two methods
of accounting is encountered when the taxpayer receives a promise
32
31
of future payment for services already rendered. For example,
on December 15, 1995, the taxpayer performs services valued at
$100 for a third party. An accrual-method taxpayer would recognize $100 of income in 1995 even though payment is deferred. A
cash-method taxpayer would recognize $100 of income only at the
time he "actually or constructively receives" the $100 payment. If
the cash-method taxpayer receives cash in 1995, he will recognize
income of $100 in' 1995. Similarly, if the cash-method taxpayer actually receives an item of personal property or other services in
exchange for the taxpayer's own services in 1995, the taxpayer
must report income in 1995 equal to the fair market value of such
property or services received.
If the $100 payment is deferred to a subsequent year, the cashmethod taxpayer will not report any income in 1995. If the right to
payment is evidenced by a negotiable promissory note or by the
granting of a security interest in some property, however, the arrangement begins to resemble a "transfer" of property in satisfaction of the debt or a "setting aside" of property for the taxpayer
that should be taxed as if cash or property had actually been received. By not taxing the transaction at present, an artificial defer29 See Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128, 137 (1963); American Auto. Ass'n v.
United States, 367 U.S. 687, 697-98 (1961); Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1957).
30 The possibility of deferring income is limited to extremely narrow situations.
See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-43-083 (Aug. 1, 1991). For example, in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-43-083
(Aug. 1, 1991) the taxpayer sought to defer income recognition under a cooperative
advertising arrangement until the taxpayer filed a claim for reimbursement. Id. The
taxpayer unsuccessfully argued that the "all events" test had not been met because a
claim for refund had not been filed and might never be filed. See id.
31 See Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244, 245 (1951), affd, 194 F.2d 541 (6th
Cir. 1952). The cash equivalence and economic benefit doctrines are generally not
applied to deferred payment sales that are covered by other provisions. See MICHAELJ.
GRAETz & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
728 (3d. ed. 1995).
32 See GERTZMAN, supra note 20, at 3-13.
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ral device is created whereby the taxpayer is assured of future
payment without current taxation. The Commissioner will seek to
include the secured amounts in gross income in the year in which
such arrangements are established. In these situations the distinction between cash and accrual methods of accounting becomes
blurred, if not totally eliminated. 3
A.

Doctrines Affecting Timing of Cash-Method Income Recognition

The constructive receipt, cash equivalence, and economic
benefit doctrines address 3 4 when and under what circumstances a
cash-method taxpayer must report income prior to actually receiving the cash payment.
1.

Constructive Receipt

The constructive receipt doctrine expands the concept of "receipt" to include items generally made available to the taxpayer
provided they are not subject "to substantial limitations or restrictions." The Treasury Regulation provides:
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession
is constructively received by him in the taxable year during
which it is credited to his account, set apartfor him, or otherwise made
availableso that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could
have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention to
withdraw had been given. However, income is not constructively
received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions ....
For income recognition purposes, constructive receipt focuses
on whether the taxpayer has the power to obtain possession of the
income. 6 If the power to receive payment exists and the taxpayer
33 The blurring begins when the taxpayer receives something more than a mere
promise by the third party, such as: a promise guaranteed by a solvent company, a
secured position on property of the third party, or the third party is induced to delay
payment for the purpose of shifting the income to a later year.
34 See Childs v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 634, 642 (1994), affid, 89 F.3d 856 (11th
Cir. 1996); Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 141 (1st Cir. 1983), rev k45 T.C.M.
(CCH) 398 (1982); Sproul4 16 T.C. at 245; United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863,
864 (2d. Cir. 1950).
35 See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979) (emphasis added); Minor v.
United States, 772 F.2d 1472, 1473 (9th Cir. 1985).
36 See Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483, 490 (1st Cir. 1948). The elements of
the constructive receipt doctrine have been summarized as follows:
(1) An amount is immediately due and owing.
(2) The obligor is ready, willing and able to pay that amount.
(3) The amount due and owing is credited to the taxpayer on the
books of the obligor or in a separate bank account.
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chooses not to exercise it, the taxpayer will be treated as constructively receiving the income and taxed accordingly. s7 Thus, the constructive receipt doctrine prevents the taxpayer from deferring
income 38 by merely turning his back on it and unilaterally selecting
the year of reporting."
Constructive receipt can be used by the Commissioner or the
taxpayer 41 to include payments in income prior to the year in
which payment is actually received. The standard for income recognition under the doctrine of constructive receipt is whether the
taxpayer has unfettered discretion over the receipt of income or
whether the receipt is subject to restrictions or limitations that are
not self-imposed by the taxpayer. 4
(4) Either the taxpayer can freely withdraw the amount due and owing
without restrictions or limitations, or has an unconditional vested right
to receive that amount.
(5) The taxpayer is aware of the foregoing facts.
Patricia Ann Metzer, Constructive Receipt, Economic Benefit and Assignment of Income: A
Case Study in Deferred Compensation, 29 N.Y.U. TAX L. REv. 525, 531 (1974) (footnotes
omitted).
37 See GERTZMAN, supra note 20, at 3-22. Gertzman noted that the doctrine included in taxable income, money or other property:
(1) that is subject to the taxpayer's unfettered will and control;
(2) that the taxpayer is free to enjoy at his own option;
(3) that exists and is available to taxpayer; and
(4) that except for taxpayer's own volition, can immediately be reduced
to his possession.
Id.
38 See Ross, 169 F.2d at 491. The Ross court stated:
The doctrine of constructive receipt was, no doubt, conceived by the
Treasury in order to prevent taxpayers from choosing the year in which
to return income merely by choosing the year in which to reduce it to
possession. Thereby the Treasury may subject income to taxation when
the only thing preventing its reduction to possession is the volition of
the taxpayer.

Id.
See Hamilton Nat'l Bank v.Commissioner, 29 B.TA. 63, 67 (1933).
See Carter v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 654, 654 (1980); Hornung v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428, 434 (1967). In Carter,the taxpayer did not receive wages
for the last two months of 1974 until sometime in 1975. 40 T.C.M. (CCH) at 654.
The taxpayer argued unsuccessfully that because his employer had budgeted the
funds in 1974, he constructively received the wages in 1974. See id. Because the taxpayer did not have "free and unrestricted control of his wages prior to actual receipt"
the court held he had not received the wages. See id. at 655. Likewise, in Hornung,a
professional athlete was awarded a 1962 Corvette on December 31, 1961, for his performance in a game that day although possession did not occur until 1962. 47 T.C. at
430. Nevertheless, the taxpayer claimed the year of inclusion was 1961 (a year for
which the statute of limitations had run). See id. at 433. Because the automobile,
which was located in another city, could not physically be delivered in 1961, the court
held that the constructive receipt doctrine did not apply. See id. at 435.
41 Specifically, check receipt cases have struggled with this concept. In Davis v.
39
40
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Bittker and Lokken, two recognized tax scholars, identify
seven categories in which the doctrine of constructive receipt becomes problematic. 4 2 Of particular relevance are situations where
the constructive receipt and economic benefit doctrines interrelate: contracted due dates; amended due dates; substantial limitations on payment; escrows, security arrangements, and third-party
promises.
Contracted due dates and amended due dates typically arise in
the same context. Where the taxpayer contracts for a future payment date or modifies an existing contract to provide for a new
payment date, the contracted (or amended) date will be honored
for tax purposes provided the agreement is reached prior to the
due date. Once the payment becomes due, however, the constructive receipt doctrine will prevent any modification for a delayed
date. Thus, except in extreme cases,43 if the taxpayer's agreement
is made prior to the payment becoming due, the delay in income
recognition should be upheld. This result reflects the principle
that tax results "cannot be administered by speculating whether
the payor would have been willing to agree to an earlier payCommissioner, the taxpayer received notice after 5:00 P.M. on December 31, 1974, that
a certified letter was waiting for her at the post office. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 42, 42
(1978). The taxpayer claimed the letter on January 2, 1975 and discovered that it
contained a severance paycheck. See id. The Commissioner sought to include the
check in the taxpayer's 1974 income, but the Tax Court held that the essence of
constructive receipt is the volition or knowledge of the taxpayer. See id. at 45. Therefore, the court explained that without such knowledge, the taxpayer was not in constructive receipt of the check. See id. Other cases have held that cash was
constructively received when the taxpayer could actually have received the cash in
hand. See Baxter v. Commissioner, 816 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1987); Avery v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 210, 215 (1934); Lavery v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 859, 860 (7th
Cir. 1946). For example, the Kahler court held that a check received after banking
hours on December 31st was taxable in the year received because property having a
fair market value had been received. Kahler v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 31, 34-35
(1952). GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 31, at 725 suggest that Kahler is "more
appropriate."
42 See Br-rKxER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, at 105-53 to 105-59. The authors discuss
the following categories:
(1) when the due date is fixed by contract,
(2) when payment is deferred by amending the contract,
(3) where payment is subject to substantial limitations,
(4) interest on frozen bank accounts, (See I.R.C. § 451(g))
(5) escrows, security arrangements, and third-party promises,
(6) checks received at the end of the year, and
(7) losses.
Id.
43 See id. at 105-53 (suggesting that absent extreme situations, such as an employer
and employee arranging the time and amount of payment of the next days wages on a
daily basis, the agreement of the parties will govern).
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ment."4 4 Nevertheless, it is unwise to allow a taxpayer unlimited
discretion in determining the year of payment without any consideration of the economic merits of the transaction; hence, some
limits are necessary.4 5
Deferring income recognition by prior agreement is well established.4 6 In Veit v. Commissioner,4 7 Howard Veit was entitled to a
bonus from his employer based on his employer's 1940 profits,
which were to be determined and paid in 1941.48 In November
1940, Veit and his employer agreed that the 1940 profit allocation
would be paid in four installments during 1942.49 After the 1940
profits were determined in 1941, but before the first installment
became due, Veit and his employer entered a second agreement
that provided that the installments to be paid in 1942 would instead be paid in five annual installments between 1942 and 1946.50
The Commissioner sought to include the 1940 profit allocation in
Veit's income in 1941 because the amount was determined in that
year. 1 Finding that the 1940 deferral arrangement "was an arm's
52
length business transaction that was mutually profitable to both"
parties, the court honored the contracted payment dates for tax
purposes."
The Veit case made a second trip to the court where the 1941
44 See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 178. Bittker and Lokken stated that "it
would be virtually impossible to administer a rule requiring a case-by-case review of
the precontract negotiations to determine whether the obligor would have agreed to
an earlier date without any concessions by the taxpayer." BrrrKER & LOKKEN supra
note 21, at 105-53. Moreover, the Gullett court stated:
[T]he doctrine of constructive receipt is to be sparingly used; that
amounts due from a corporation but unpaid, are not to be included in
the income of an individual reporting his income on a cash receipt basis
unless it appears that the money was available to him, that the corporation was able and ready to pay him, that his right to receive [money] was
not restricted, and that his failure to receive [money] resulted from exercise of his own choice.
45 Gullet v. Commissioner, 31 B.TA. 1067, 1069 (1935). See infra notes 274 and
accompanying text.
46 SeeCommissionerv. Oates, 18 T.C. 570, 571 (1952), affd, 207 F.2d 711, 712 (7th
Cir. 1953); Willits v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 602, 619 (1968); Veit v. Commissioner, 8
T.C.M. (CCH) 919, 922 (1949) [hereinafter Veit II]; Veit v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 809,
816 (1947) [hereinafter Veit 1].For a discussion of Veit I and II, see Scott, supra note 6,
at 23-24.
47 8 T.C. 809 (1947).
48 See id. at 811.
49 See id. at 812.
50 See id. at 813.
51 See id. at 816.
52 See Veit v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. at id.
53 See id. at 818.
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agreement modifying the 1942 payment schedule was examined.
The court concluded that because Veit was never able to demand
immediate payment, the second agreement would likewise be effective in deferring income recognition.5 4 The key to the Veit cases
was that the agreement was a bona fide arm's-length agreement.5 5
Such an agreement prevents the application of the doctrine of constructive receipt unless it is shown to be "a mere subterfuge and
sham for the purpose of enabling petitioner to postpone his income tax to another year."5 6
Bittker and Lokken's third category applies where payment is
subject to substantial limitations. The authors note that, under the
treasury regulations, modest penalties for early withdrawal from a
segregated account (i.e. three months interest) would be considered substantial restrictions on the receipt of payment.5 7 Other
cases have held that modest restrictions on the receipt of funds
prevents the inclusion of income under the doctrine of constructive receipt. Examples include life insurance policies that restrict
cash value withdrawals and policies or annuities that can only be
cashed out at less than the replacement value.5" Accordingly, absolute prohibitions on early withdrawal would be a substantial
limitation.5 9
The final category-escrows, security arrangements, and thirdparty promises-creates a conflict for the taxpayer. The "holy
grail"60 of total security without taxation is defined as: assurance
54 See Veit II, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) at 922.
55 See id; Veit , 8 T.C. at 816. Deferred compensation rulings will only be issued if
the agreements for deferred compensation are entered into prior to the calendar year
in which the services are to be performed. See Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
56 Veit I, 8 T.C. at 816. The IRS has taken the position that a deferral election must
be made prior to the year the services were to be performed. See Rev. Rul. 69-650,
1969-2 C.B. 106. The Tax Court reaffirmed its holding in Veit /!while setting forth a
five-point test for determining when an employee had constructively received income.
See Martin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 814, 814 (1991); PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-CASEs AND MATEIALS 1077-78 (3d ed. 1994); BrrrKER & LoKKEN, supra note 21, at 105-54.
57 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1995), 1.451-2(a) (as
amended in 1979). In Miele, a lawyer was only taxed on client advances placed in a
segregated account when the lawyer became entitled to withdraw from the account.
Miele v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 284, 291 (1979). Moreover, Bittker and Lokken note
that restrictions on interest accruals for more than one year will recharacterize the
interest as original issue discount and require it to be reported according to the original issue discount provisions of I.R.C. § 1274. See BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, at
105-54, n.31; 105-55.
58 See BrrrKER & LoKKEN, supra note 21, at 105-55 n.33.
59 See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
60 See A. Thomas Brisendine, Chief of Branch 1 of the IRS Office of Associate
Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations), reported 69 Tax
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that the payment will be made without establishing sufficient
of
power over the assets securing payment to trigger the doctrines
61
constructive receipt, cash equivalence, or economic benefit.
Common arrangements to avoid triggering the doctrines involve finding a guarantor for the payment or setting aside assets in
a trust. While the presence of a guarantor is generally not deemed
to trigger income recognition, a financially strong guarantor could
result in the promise being viewed as a cash equivalent.6 2 Nevertheless, these common arrangements avoid income recognition because courts narrowly apply the constructive receipt doctrine.
The Commissioner's definitive statement regarding the application of the constructive receipt doctrine to deferred compensation arrangements is Revenue Ruling 60-31.63 In a series of
examples, the Commissioner establishes several guidelines for the
compensation area. First, unfunded employer promises of future
payment are not currently taxed to the employee.6 4 Second, if the
employer and employee agree to the arrangement prior to performance of the services, the agreement will be effective to defer
income recognition.6 5 Third, it is irrelevant that the employer is
Notes 1509 (Dec. 18, 1995). Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 96-09-010 (Mar. 1, 1996) held such terms
preclude deferral of income to the beneficiaries. See alsoJ. Martin Burke & Michael
K. Friel, Escrow Agreement Effectively Delays Income for a Cash-Basis Taxpayer, 8 Rev. of
Tax'n of Individuals 251 (1984).
61 See BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supranote 21, at 105-56 to 105-57. Taxpayers, desiring to
defer income but concerned with the solvency of the obligor, seek greater security
than the mere promise to pay. See id. at 105-56. As the security becomes more substantial, the likelihood of the arrangement being "viewed as the equivalent of cash or
as constructive receipt of an amount entrusted to the obligor... becomes greater."
Id. An employer's promise of future payments funded by an annuity that remains the
property of the employer and subject to the employer's creditors is deemed to be
constructively received. See Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d 810, 817 (Ct. Cl.
1978); United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1950);
62 See Bn-rKER & LOKKEN, supranote 21, at 105-57; see also Watson v. Commissioner,
613 F.2d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing that payment was secured by a letter of
credit).
63 See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174. Bittker and Lokken refer to the ruling as
the "fountainhead of learning on the subject of nonqualified deferred compensation." BrrriKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, at 60-3.
64 See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B., at 177. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in
1985) excludes an "unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or property in
the future" from the definition of "property" thereby excluding such promises from
coverage under I.R.C. § 83, which applies to transfers of "property."
65 The Commissioner will only issue rulings if the agreement is reached prior to
the period for which the services will be performed. See Rev. Rul. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B.
184. Rulings will not be issued where the agreement is modified prior to the payment
becoming due unless the plan requires a substantial forfeiture provision that is effective throughout the deferral period. See id.; see also Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428;
Rev. Rul. 71-419, 1971-2 C.B. 220 (indicating that the period for which the services
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willing to pay the compensation currently. 66 Finally, Revenue Ruling 60-31 extends the analysis beyond constructive receipt and applies the economic benefit doctrine to deferred compensation
67
arrangements.
2.

Cash Equivalence

Under the cash equivalence doctrine, a taxpayer who receives
a promise that is the equivalent of cash must report the income as
if cash had been received. 68 The focus 69 is whether the taxpayer

received something that he can readily convert into cash. 7' The
form of property7 ' that creates most of the difficulty is the receipt
of a promise of future payment, such as: an account receivable, a
contract right, a promissory note, or similar form.
Including the fair market value of a promise of future payrendered is the taxpayer's taxable year); Rev. Rul. 69-650, 1969-2 C.B. 106; Rev. Rul.
68-86. 1968-1 C.B. 184.
(6 See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B., at 178.
67 See id.
68 The cash

method is considered "easily understood by laymen, requires only rudimentary books and records, minimizes or eliminates the need for the allocation of
income and expenses between two or more taxable years, and ordinarily assigns tax
liabilities to the period when cash is available... " BrrITR & LOKKEN, supra note 21,
at 105-48.
69 In describing the cash equivalence doctrine, Gertzman focuses on whether "income is in such a form (or is of such a character) that its receipt should trigger its
recognition for tax purposes." GERTZMAN, supra note 20, at 3-13.
70 Gertzman alleges that read literally, I.R.C. §§ 61, 446, and 451 suggest that when
something is received, the only question is whether the item has a readily ascertainable fair market value, and if it does, taxation would be immediate and appropriate.
See GERTZMAN, supra note 20, at 3-14 (citing I.R.C. §§ 61, 446, 451 (1986)). Gertzman
suggests that I.R.C. § 1001(b) is consistent with this interpretation, because the
amount realized is defined solely in terms of cash and the fair market value of property received in a property transaction. See id. (citing I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1986)).
Where the amount realized does not have a readily ascertainable fair market value,
the transaction could be considered open until the amount is eventually determined.
See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404i 412-13 (1931) (holding that value of mineral
royalties received in exchange for stock in mineral company were indeterminable at
the time the transaction was closed and taxation was deferred until determination).
71 The basis for the cash equivalence doctrine finds its genesis in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.446-1 (c) (i) which provides:
[G]enerally, under the cash receipts and disbursements method in the
computation of taxable income, all items which constitute gross income
(whether in the form of cash, property, or services) are to be included for the
taxable year in which actually or constructively received.
Treas. Reg. §1.446-1(c)(i) (as amended in 1993) (emphasis added).
Although this statement is broad enough to include any promise to pay, courts
have narrowed its scope considerably. SeeJohn F. Cooper, The Economic Benefit Doctrine: How an UnconstitutionalRight to a FutureBenefit Can Cause a Current Tax Detriment,
71 MARQ. L. REv. 217, 230 (1988).
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ment in income when received creates two obvious problems.
First, the taxpayer may not have funds to pay the tax. The cash
equivalence doctrine should consider whether the taxpayer is sufficiently liquid to pay the taxes.72 Second, including mere promises
to pay in the gross income of cash-method taxpayers will blur the
distinction between cash and accrual methods of accounting.
The most frequently cited case defining cash equivalence is
Cowden v. Commissioner.73 In Cowden, the taxpayer entered into a
mineral lease where an oil company agreed to make bonus payments to the taxpayer over a three-year period. The Tax Court
held that the right to the bonus payments was readily and immediately convertible to cash and, therefore, was the equivalent of cash.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court because the fair market
value of the actual contract received by the taxpayers was not properly calculated. The Fifth Circuit identified the following criteria
for determining whether a promise is a cash equivalent: the promise is (1) made by a solvent obligor; (2) unconditional; (3) assignable; (4) not subject to set-offs; and (5) of a kind that is frequently
transferred to lenders or investors at a discount not substantially
greater than the generally prevailing premium for the use of
money. 4
Other cases have added the requirement that the note be in75
tended as payment rather than as mere evidence of the debt.
One commentator summarized the cash equivalence doctrine as
72 There are numerous instances in which the taxpayer must report income despite the unavailability of cash. See I.R.C. §§ 83, 1242 (1986).
73 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961). Gertzman refers to Cowden as "traditional cash
equivalence." GERTZMAN, supra note 20, at 3-16.
74 See Cowden, 289 F.2d at 24. The Cowden court stated:
A promissory note, negotiable in form, is not necessarily the equivalent
of cash. Such an instrument may have been issued by a maker of doubtful solvency or for other reasons such paper might be denied a ready
[f a promise to pay off a solvent
acceptance in the market place ....
obligor is unconditional and assignable, not subject to set-offs, and is of
a kind that is frequently transferred to lenders or investors at a discount
not substantially greater than the generally prevailing premium for the
use of money, such promise is the equivalent of cash and taxable in like

manner as cash ....

The principle that negotiability is not the test of

taxability in an equivalent of cash case such as is before us... points up
the doctrine that substance and not form should control in the application of the income tax laws.
Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 68-606, 1968-2 C.B. 42.
75 See Schlemmer v. United States, 94 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding that the
taxpayer was not required to include a note received as salary in income where the
note was not intended as payment but merely as evidence of the obligation and could
not be treated as cash).
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an inquiry into the likelihood of eventual payment. 76
Gertzman, a well-known tax scholar, would require that all the
Cowden requirements be met before any amount would be included in gross income. He suggests that to do otherwise "would
impose unnecessary complexity and undue hardship on the taxpayer or otherwise would be inconsistent with the use of the cash
method."77 Gertzman acknowledges two alternative approaches to
determine the cash equivalence of the obligor's promise that are
less restrictive than Cowden.7s First, if the promise has a fair market
value and a ready market, the amount should be included in income. Second, if the promise merely has a fair market value, the
amount should be included in income.
Under his first alternative, Gertzman would include the fair
market value of the promise in the taxpayer's income regardless of
whether it is considered equivalent to cash. One ruling suggests
that a ready market is essential for inclusion. 79 Whenever the taxpayer has the power to obtain cash, he should not be permitted to
ignore the economic realities of the transaction.8s
76

See Scott, supra note 6, at 6-7, 18, 35-36. Scott states:
Receipt of a promise is income if it is considered to be the equivalent of
cash. A promise is equivalent to cash if it is likely that the recipient
eventually will receive cash or property. On the other hand, if substantial doubt exists concerning eventual collection, the promise is not the

equivalent of cash.
Id. at 18.
77 GERTZMAN, supra note 20, at 3-17; see also Bright v. United states, 926 F.2d 383,
387 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the amount of gross income of a check when re-

ceived should be included in income because the funds were available).
78 Gertzman's first approach to resolve the issue of when intangible property is
taxed is as follows:
[A) mere right to receive cash (as evidenced by a contract, note, or
other written instrument) should not be taxed until such right is con-

verted into cash or into property rights that are essentially equivalent to
cash, without regard to whether the initial right to receive cash has an
ascertainable FMV [fair market value] or is in any particular form.

GERTZMAN, supra note 20, at 3-16.
79 See Rev. Rul. 73-173, 1973-1

C.B. 40 (suggesting that the inquiry centers on
whether the taxpayer receives a present economic benefit such as a right that can be
transferred). The Revenue Ruling explains that the inquiry is whether the rights are
"freely transferable," "readily marketable," and "immediately convertible to cash." Id,
The ruling involved a taxpayer who received breeding rights to a thoroughbred stallion, which could be valued and had a ready market. See id. at 41. Accordingly, the
value of the rights were included in the taxpayer's income because they were considered the equivalent of cash. See id.
80 Cowden recognized that the rigidities of the rules must yield to practical realities.
The court stated:
[Tihe taxpayers urge that there can be no 'equivalent of cash' obligation unless it is a negotiable instrument. Such a test, to be determined
by the form of the obligation, is as unrealistic as it is formalistic. The
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Gertzman's second alternative is that the cash equivalence
doctrine would apply if the promise of future payment had a readily ascertainable fair market value. 8 ' The problem with such an approach is that amounts would be included in income even though
the taxpayer is required to accept a significant discount to obtain
the cash to pay the tax. This approach is taken in the installment
sales regulations where automatic inclusion is the "penalty" for opting out of the installment sales provisions.8 2 If liquidity is a goal,
then this approach should be taken sparingly.
income tax law deals in economic realities, not legal abstractions, and
the reach of the income tax law is not to be delimited by technical refinements or mere formalism.
Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961) (citations omitted).
81 See Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 1975), revg
60 T.C. 663 (1973) (holding that if the contract had an ascertainable fair market
value, that amount must be included in the amount realized to determine gain or loss
and the character of such gain or loss under I.R.C. § 1001 even though the taxpayer
must take a 50% discount to negotiate the note).
The concern that taxpayers would be required to recognize income regardless of
the discount has been alleviated by the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, which
revised the installment sales provisions under I.R.C. § 453 (1986). See BrrlrKR & LOKKEN, supra note 21, at 105-50; GERTZMAN, supra note 20, at 3-18 to 3-19; GRAETZ &
SCHENK, supra note 31, at 728-29; McDANIEL, supra note 56, at 981-2.
Moreover, McDaniel notes that Prop. Regs. § 1.1 00 1-1(g) (1993) provides that
the amount realized on any sale of property is the adjusted issue price of the debt
obligation under the original issue discount rules without regard to whether § 453
applies. McDANIEL, supra note 56, at 982. McDaniel concludes that the effect of the
proposed regulations is to eliminate the cash equivalency doctrine as applied to sale
of property. See id. But see Bright v. United States, 926 F.2d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1991)
(suggesting that the cash equivalence doctrine may still be applicable to sales of
property).
82 A taxpayer who elects not to have the gain on a sale reported on the installment
basis must include the amount of the sale in gross income if it has a fair market value.
See I.R.C. § 483 (1986). Specifically, the regulation provides:
A taxpayer who elects not to report an installment sale on the installment method must recognize gain on the sale in accordance with the
taxpayer's method of accounting. The fair market value of an installment obligation shall be determined in accordance with ... this section.
In making such determination, any provision of contract or local law
restricting the transferability of the installment obligation shall be disregarded. Receipt of an installment obligation shall be treated as a receipt of property, in an amount equal to the fair market value of the
installment obligation, whether or not such obligation is the equivalent of
cash. An installment obligation is considered to be property and is subject to valuation ... without regard to whether the obligation is embodied in note, an executory contract, or any other instrument, or is an oral
promise enforceable under local law.
Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1 (d) (2) (i) (as amended in 1994) (emphasis added). Further,
the fair market value of the obligation will never be less than the fair market value of
the property sold, minus any other consideration received by the taxpayer. See Treas.
Reg. § 15A.453-1 (d) (2) (ii) (as amended in 1994).
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The Cowden requirements set forth a fairly clear basis for
resolving the issues: if the taxpayer can get cash without a discount,
taxation should occur.
3.

Economic Benefit

The economic benefit doctrine8" includes amounts in the
gross income of cash basis taxpayers when the right to the future
payment is nonforfeitable and a fund is set aside for the future
payment. While the constructive receipt and cash equivalence doctrines are well-defined and provide a sound basis for analysis, the
84
economic benefit doctrine is not as clear.
The economic benefit doctrine is, however, clearly applicable
to deferred compensation arrangements. For example, Revenue
Rule 60-31 (example 4) involved a professional athlete who directed the football club to deposit a signing bonus into an escrow
fund to be paid over a five-year period. The ruling held that the
bonus constituted income to the athlete when deposited in the escrow account, not because there was constructive receipt, but because the taxpayer received an economic benefit. The
Commissioner's reliance on Sproull v. Commissioner reaffirmed the
economic benefit doctrine's application in the compensation area,
83 Metzer notes the history of the economic benefit doctrine:

The formal concept of economic benefit emerged as late as 1945, in
Commissioner v. Smith where the Supreme Court indicated that the income tax laws were 'broad enough to include in taxable income any
economic or financial benefit conferred on [an] employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected.' Unlike the
concept of constructive receipt, the concept of economic benefit
emerged in the area of employee compensation, where it continues to
be more relevant than in other areas of federal income taxation.
See Metzer, supra note 36, at 550 (footnotes omitted). Cooper suggests that the elements of the doctrine were established with Sproull v. Commissioner and that subsequent decisions were refinements or applications of the Sproull standards. See Cooper,
supra note 71, at 238; see also Lawrence A. Frolik, The Convergence of LRC. § 104(A)(2),
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt and Structured Tort Settlements: Tax Policy
Derailed, 51 FoRDH"A L. REv. 565, 577 (1983) (asserting that the genesis of the doctrine was found in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,which held that taxes paid on
behalf of an employee constituted additional income to the employer).
84 According to Friedhoff, "[t] he correct focus of the constructive receipt doctrine
is when the escrow was imposed, rather than the nature of its imposition ....
[T] he
distinction between the economic benefit and constructive receipt doctrines is somewhat artificial ..
" See Gary Friedhoff, Reed v. Commissioner: A Case for the Economic
Bene/it Doctrine, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 1001, 1008 (1985). Metzer states: "constructive receipt deals with 'when' property should be included in a taxpayer's gross income
(when actually received or at some point prior to actual receipt), while economic
benefit deals with 'what' property or rights actually received by the taxpayer should be
subject to immediate taxation." Metzer, supra note 36, at 551. In this regard, cash
equivalence is akin to an economic benefit.
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although its application outside the area has been questioned. 85
The lines between economic benefit and both constructive receipt and cash equivalence are unclear. 86 One court 87 equated
economic benefit with the cash equivalence by requiring that the
benefit not only have an ascertainable fair market value but also
that it.was the equivalent of cash." Some commentators 9 do not
acknowledge the economic benefit doctrine as a distinct doctrine9 °
and address all situations under the constructive receipt doctrine if
85 See Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'g45 T.C.M. (CCH)
398 (1982); GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 31, at 726 (acknowledging that the economic benefit doctrine originated in compensation cases).
86 See id. at 728. In Pulsifer v. Commissioner a minor was held taxable on lottery
winnings deposited in a bank account to be held until the child reached majority or a
guardian applied for them. 64 T.C. 245, 246 (1975). The court relied on the economic benefit doctrine because a fund had been irrevocably set aside beyond the
reach of the payor's creditors. See id. at 247. The presence of a cash fund suggests
cash equivalence and the ability of a guardian to obtain the funds suggests constructive receipt. See id. at 247-48. Similarly, in Anastasio, lottery winnings were taxed when
paid to the child's parents because the child "received sufficient economic and financial benefits" to be taxable at that point. Anastasio v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814
(1977), affd in unpublished opinion, 573 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1977). The court explained that payment to the parents suggested constructive receipt. See id. at 818.
Interestingly, both cases relied solely on the economic benefit doctrine set forth in
Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), affid, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952).
87 See Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 147 (1983), rev'g45 T.C.M. (CCH) 398
(1982). The Minor court described the economic benefit doctrine as an alternative
method to constructive receipt for determining when a taxpayer receives taxable benefits. See Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472, 1474 (1985).
88 Scott divides the economic benefit doctrine into two categories: 1) funded
promises in which property is set aside and not subject to the claims of creditors of
the obligor, and 2) unfunded promises to pay that are subject to the claims of the
obligor's creditors and are only income if "adequately marketable," which are
promises that can be used to obtain cash. See Scott, supra note 6, at 29; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.83-1 (a)(1) (1978).
89 See Cooper, supra note 71, at 250, applying the economic benefit doctrine to
prizes and awards in which contest winnings were deposited into an account to be
paid out over a period of time. The specific ruling applied the economic benefit
doctrine and required the reporting of the discounted value of future payments in
the year the winnings were set aside. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,373 (Nov. 21, 1966).
Moreover, the ruling provided the basis for addressing a situation in which a minor
won the Irish Sweepstakes and the receipts were deposited in court until he reached
the age of majority. The ruling discounted value of the funds taxable under the economic benefit doctrine. The fact that the minor had no right to assign the funds was
irrelevant. See infra note 84 for a discussion of two cases addressing the issue of prizes
and awards.
90 Bittker and Lokken do not discuss the economic benefit doctrine and consider
Sproull a cash equivalence case, stating:
For the difference between the constructive receipt doctrine and the
requirement that cash basis taxpayers report 'cash equivalents' when received see Sproull v. Commissioner ... (in taxing bonus to taxpayer in
year it was paid by employer to trustee to hold, invest, and pay over in
later years, court rejected IRS' constructive receipt argument but con-
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assets are set aside 9 or under the cash equivalence doctrine if nonforfeitable, marketable rights are involved.9 2
The economic benefit doctrine includes amounts in income
even though the taxpayer does not have the power to obtain payment directly from the obligor or indirectly by transfer to a third
party.9" Further, benefits do not need to be assignable, which is a
key to the cash equivalence doctrine. 4 It is sufficient that the taxpayer obtain a right in some asset or fund 95 which, although not
subject to the taxpayer's immediate control, is valuable, unconditional, and nonforfeitable.
The economic benefit doctrine deals with nonforfeitable
rights and, thus, embraces situations not covered by I.R.C. § 83.96
cluded that employee's rights under trust were equivalent of cash)[.
B]ut see Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 CB 174.
BITTKER & LOKEN supra note 21, at 105-51 n.22. The authors also describe Sproull in
their discussion of the constructive receipt category "escrows, security arrangements,
third party promises, etc." pointing out that the greater security the taxpayer has, the
greater likelihood the amount will be considered as constructively received or the
equivalent of cash. See id. at 105-56 to 105-57. Gertzman neither discusses the economic benefit doctrine nor cites to Sproull or Drescher. See GERTZMAN, supranote 20, at
3-17, 3-18.
91 See BrrrKER & LOKKEN supra note 21, at 105-56, 105-57.
92 One commentator states:
The terms cash equivalent and economic benefit are assumed here to be
interchangeable. Some people draw a distinction in which cash equivalence refers only to certain promises to pay received from the other
party to an exchange. All other noncash benefits (including promises to
pay of third parties) are referred to as economic benefits. The distinction is little used. In fact, the courts and commentators often seem unable to recognize the obvious distinction between constructive receipt,
on the one hand, and cash equivalence or economic benefit, on the
other hand.
WILLIAM A.

KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

55 & n.113 (10th

ed. 1994).
93 See United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1950) (stating that such
control or power was not necessary). Scott notes the similarity, stating: "Cash equivalence is similar to constructive receipt inthat both doctrines are premised on a reasonable opportunity to obtain payment." Scott, supra note 6, at 35; Treas. Reg. 1.4461(a)(3) (1992); Treas Reg. 1.61-2(d)(4) (1989); Treas. Reg. 1.451-2(a) (1979).
94 See Anastasio v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814 (1977), affid in unpublished opinion,
573 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1977).
95 A "fund" is created when an amount is irrevocably deposited with a third party,
and a service provider's interest in such a fund is "vested" if it is nonforfeitable. See
Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 93-36-001. (Sept. 10, 1996)
96 According to Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 93-36-001 (Sept. 10, 1996), I.R.C. § 83 (1986) is a
codification of the economic benefit doctrine. The Commissioner states:
Section 83 of the Code is generally believed to be a codification of the
economic benefit doctrine as it applies to transfers of property as remuneration for services. Therefore, in analyzing the definition of 'property,' it is helpful to briefly review the economic benefit doctrine.
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Under I.R.C. § 83, rights to property "transferred" are automatically included in income if they are nonforfeitable.97 Unsecured
promises are not subject to I.R.C. § 83 because they do not fit that
section's definition of "property"9" and are not considered capable
of valuation. 99 The presence of a fund creates a situation that is
not covered by the fundamental rule that unfunded and unsecured
promises to pay in the future such as notes, accounts receivable,
and similar rights, 00 do not create taxable income for the cash baUnder that doctrine, a service recipient's creation of a fund in which a
service provider has vested rights will result in immediate inclusion of
the amount funded in the service provider's gross income.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-36-001 (Sept. 10, 1996). For legislative history of I.R.C. § 83, see
H.R. Rep. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 86-89 (1969); H.R. Rep. No. 91413 (Part 2), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 61-65 (1969); S Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 119-24 (1969); Cong. Rep. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 303-04 (1969).
97 I.R.C. § 83 (1986) determines when property transferred in exchange for services is included in income. I.R.C. § 83 builds on the concept of constructive receipt
and asks whether the property is "transferable" or is "not subject to substantial risk of
forfeiture." See I.R.C. § 83 (1986). Transferability and risk of forfeiture are substantive terms and their definitions should not be constrained by artificial (i.e. formal
limitations) or general rules. Such formalities should be disregarded and the economic realities used to determine the tax result. The theory of I.R.C. § 83 is that "the
taxpayer does not receive a valuable economic benefit until the property is transferable or no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture." See Metzer, supra note 36,
at 544-45. The regulation provides that a substantial risk of forfeiture exists:
[W] here rights in property that are transferred are conditioned, directly
or indirectly, upon the future performance (or refraining from performance) of substantial services by any person, or the occurrence of a
condition related to a purpose of the transfer, and the possibility of
forfeiture is substantial if such condition is not satisfied.
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (as amended in 1985).
98 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985).
99 See Perry v. Commissioner 152 F.2d 183, 187 (1945); see also Minor v. United
States, 772 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that because the fund (i.e., the
trust assets) were subject to claims from the employer's creditors, the value of the
taxpayer's interest was "incapable of valuation" and could therefore not be considered property under I.R.C. § 83).
100 For example, a novation is an agreement between two parties that a new obligation will be substituted for an existing one. In Shuster v. Helvering,the Commissioner
argued that the new obligation constituted "property" that was taxable upon receipt
(i.e. upon novation of the existing agreement). Shuster v. Helvering, 121 F.2d 643,
644-45 (2d Cir. 1941). The Shuster court stated:
No word is more loosely used and it is easy enough to find authorities
speaking of contracts as "property," but the consequences of so treating
them for purposes of the income tax are absurd ....
To argue that all
these [promises] are income as soon as the obligor becomes bound,
especially when the taxpayer, as here, keeps his books on the cash basis,
is so fantastic as to deserve no discussion ....
Id. at 645; see also Commissioner v. Olmsted, 304 F.2d 16, 22-23 (8th Cir. 1962) (holding that a promise of periodic payments from the other party to the contract was not
taxable because the other party continued to be the promisor and nothing was paid
out to secure a third-party promise).
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sis taxpayer, even if such promise is non-forfeitable. °1 To include
such items in gross income without a fund would obliterate the
10 2
distinction between cash and accrual accounting.
The economic benefit doctrine requires that income be -reported when the other two doctrines do not. If the parties agree to
delay the payment before it is due, the taxpayer cannot demand
immediate payment and cannot be in constructive receipt of the
income. Because the economic benefit doctrine focuses on the nature of the rights and not the power to demand immediate payment, the prior deferral agreement is irrelevant. Where the
taxpayer took no action to defer the payment, the economic benefit doctrine was held to include an escrow fund in income upon
3
10

deposit.

The economic benefit doctrine should overcome the court's
reluctance to consider the motivation behind bona fide, arm's
length bargains. Such bargains should not immunize every deferral arrangement. Instead, funded agreements deferring payment
should be scrutinized for evidence of a risk of forfeiture or loss to
the taxpayer during the deferral period. The taxpayer could be
required to demonstrate a substantial non-tax reason for the deferred payment or prove that tax implications were not the primary
reason for the deferral. If such evidence is not found, the taxpayer's interest should be taxed at that time.
a.

United States v. Drescher

In 1939, Drescher's employer purchased a non-forfeitable, single premium annuity contract at a cost of $5000, naming Drescher
as the annuitant and providing for payments commencing when
Drescher became 65-years-old.104 Because the employer maintained possession of the annuity, Drescher could neither accelerate
nor assign the payments.10 5
The Commissioner asserted that the cost of the annuity should
101 See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960 C.B. 174, 177. The cash equivalence and the economic
benefit doctrines provide limited exceptions or limitations on this rule. See Minor, 772
F.2d at 1474, 1476; Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c) (1) (as amended in 1985).
102 See Br'TIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, at 105-49; GRiAETZ & SCHENK, supra note
31, at 715; see also McDANIEL supra note 56, at 974-75 (noting that if all claims against
another party such as notes, checks, or open account indebtedness were included in
gross income, the distinction between cash and accrual methods would be
eliminated).
103 See Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244, 248 (1951), aff.d, 194 F.2d 541 (6th
Cir. 1952).
104 United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950).
105 See id. at 864.
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be included in Drescher's 1939 income.10 6 The court held that in
1939 Drescher received, as compensation for prior services, "something" of economic benefit that Drescher did not have previously.'0 7 That "something" was the obligation of the issuer of the
annuity to pay money in the future to Drescher on the terms stated
in the annuity.'O"
The annuity was neither assignable nor accelerable. This was
not, however, sufficient to avoid inclusion under existing case
law.109 Moreover, nonassignability did not render the annuity void
of any present value. While the annuity was less valuable to the
employee than the amount paid by the employer, it was certainly
worth "something" 10 and should be taxed.11 1
Dissenting in part, Judge Clark argued that the entire cost of
purchasing the annuity should be included in Drescher's income
in the year of purchase since the normal human desire to be seid. at 863.
id. at 865-66.
108 See id. at 866.
109 See Drescher, 179 F.2d at 867. The court noted that in Ward v. Commissioner, an
annuity was taxable to the employee when it was delivered to the taxpayer and assignable by him. See id. at 865 (citing Ward v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 502 (2d Cir.
1947)).
110 The dissent felt that the two features may not affect the value as they stated:
The two features stressed in the opinion, namely, the nonassignability
and the present non-accelerability of the annuities, may add to their
usability for the particular purpose, but would seem not to change the
basis of value. Perhaps, indeed, they render the contracts more desirable not only to the employer, but also to the annuitant's wife, as making
the security provisions less easily impaired, and thus have a special appeal to a husband solicitous of his wife's future.
Id. at 868. (Clark, J., dissenting).
111 The Drescher court recognized a value in the death benefit that was payable immediately upon the death of the taxpayer:
Likewise, the assurance that any beneficiary named by him at the time
the contract was executed, or substituted by him at a later date, would in
the event of his death receive the cost of each contract, plus interest
after a few years, conferred a present economic benefit on him.
Whatever present value the life insurance feature had to him is clearly
taxable.
Id. at 866. This statement was used by the court in Goldsmith, to support its finding
that the death and disability benefit portion of a deferred income arrangement with a
physician was currently taxable even though the retirement benefit was not. Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d 810, 821 (Ct. Cl. 1978). In Goldsmith, the employee
agreed that a percentage of his salary would be used to fund a deferred compensation
arrangement. Id. at 814. The employee designated which insurance company would
be used to provide the benefits and could discontinue the arrangement on 30 days
notice. See id. The court held that the current life insurance benefit constituted an
economic benefit that was taxable currently; but, the court did not include the retirement annuity as a current benefit. See id. at 822.
106 See
107 See
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cure during retirement was satisfied to the full value of the annuity.
Recognizing that economic realities should govern tax law, the
judge stated:
[I]n the light of modern conditions of life, the satisfying of the
highly natural and indeed burning desire of most men of middle age to obtain security for their old age and for their widows
at death seems so clearly an economic benefit that I wonder it
has been questioned as much as it has. Nor do I see the need to
support this conclusion by looking for some highly theoretical
possibility of turning this benefit into immediate dollars and
cents any more than in the case where an employee is furnished
living quarters or meals. Just as the latter are valued as additional compensation, though not assigned or assignable, so I
think this highly valuable security is a purchased benefit for
these company executives .... "12
It is this economic reality that subsequent decisions such as
Reed and Childs ignore in favor of artificial distinctions. Judge
Clark rejected such distinctions stating:
[C] onsequently the making of nice distinctions in either taxability or the amount thereof between assignable or accelerable annuities or their delivery or retention by the company- after
careful forethought and advice of its attorneys with naturally an
eye on both pension and tax possibilities-seems to me improper, when the general purpose to make adequate
retirement
11 3
provisions for these employees was made so clear.

b.

Sproull v. Commissioner
Following Drescher is Sproull v. Commissioner,"' which established the economic benefit doctrine as a separate doctrine. In
Sproull, the employer awarded him a $10,500 bonus for services
performed over a number of prior years.11 5 The employer depos112 See Drescher, 179 F.2d at 867. (Clark, J., dissenting).
113 Id. (citations omitted). The Oden court made a similar point in discussing

whether promissory notes were true obligations when secured by certificates of
deposit:
Petitioners and respondent agree that [purchaser] in fact issued prom-

issory notes payable to their order. The notes were in acceptable legal
form. However, for tax purposes, conformity to legal forms is not necessarily determinative, for the incidence of taxation depends upon the
substance of a transaction. We may look at actualities and upon determination that the form employed for carrying out the challenged tax
event is unreal or a sham [we] may sustain or disregard the effect of the
fiction as best serves the purposes of the tax structure.
Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569, 575 (1971) (citations omitted).
114 16 T.C. 244 (1951), affd, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952).
115 Sproull was a large stockholder and president of Brainard Steel Corp. in 1929.

1996]

ECONOMIC BENEFIT DOCTRINE

93

ited the bonus with a local bank as trustee on December 31, 1945,
with directions to pay Sproull $5250 on December 26, 1946, and
the balance a year later. Sproull did not initiate or direct the establishment of the trust. His employer deducted $10,500 from its tax
return for 1945, the year of deposit into escrow,1 1 6 but Sproull did
not report income until 1946 and 1947, when the trust payments
were received.
The Commissioner sought to include the entire amount in
Sproull's income in 1945. Sproull argued that he neither received
nor constructively received income for 1945 because (1) he could
not reduce the money to possession in 1945, and (2) "he had no
control of the establishment of the trust." 1 7 The court noted that
even if constructive receipt had not occurred, the real issue was
whether any economic or financial benefit had been "conferred on
the employee as compensation in the taxable year[.]""' Relying
on McEwen v. Commissioner,19 the court concluded that the benefit
was taxable to Sproull. In McEwen, the taxpayer's employment
agreement provided that a portion of his compensation be paid
into a trust to fund an annuity. 20 Citing assignment of income
cases, 1 2 1 McEwen held that it was irrelevant whether the annuity was
See id. at 245. His salary had been set at $12,000 per year, but when Brainard Steel ran
into financial difficulties, Sproull voluntarily decreased his compensation for a
number of years. See id. In 1945, when Brainard Steel had once again become successful, the board of directors authorized a $10,500 cash bonus for Sproull in consideration of his prior services, which the board felt had not been adequately
compensated. See id.
116 The deduction predates the enactment of I.R.C. § 404(d) (5), which would have
denied the deduction until included in Sproull's income.
117 See Sproull, 16 T.C. at 246; see also Fetzer Refrigerator Co. v. United States, 437
F.2d 577, 580 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding that a taxpayer who controlled a corporation
had constructively received rents that were recorded on the books of the corporation
because the taxpayer had authority to draw checks); Newmark v. Commissioner, 311
F.2d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1962) (finding income includible where the taxpayer who received corporate notes in lieu of a salary had sufficient control over the corporation
to convert the notes into cash at will). But see Hyland v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 422,
424 (2d Cir. 1949) (explaining that shareholders did not have authority to issue
checks, and therefore, income was not includible). See generally GRAETZ & SCHENK,
supra note 31, at 718.
118 See Sproull 16 T.C. at 247. The language of the Sproull opinion is confusing.
Although the court acknowledged that the cash equivalence doctrine would apply to
the case, it proceeds to discuss the Brodie and McEwen cases without indicating
whether- it is merely expanding the cash equivalence doctrine or identifying a separate doctrine.
119 6 T.C. 1018 (1947).
120 Id.
121

The McEwen court stated:
The petitioner herein was the recipient in 1941 of an economic benefit
just as much as was the taxpayer in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
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delivered either to the taxpayer or the trustee if an economic benefit was unconditionally conferred upon the employee. 122 The key
to the economic benefit doctrine is that the interest is non-forfeita-

ble and funded. When these elements are established, the only
12

question is one of valuation. 1
The court's reasoning in Sproull could be viewed as expanding
then existing doctrines or as creating a new doctrine. It could be
viewed as an expansion of the cash equivalence doctrine because
the factors influencing the court's decision, 124 particularly an ascertainable
value and assignability, are factors creating a cash equivalence.12 5 On the other hand, it could be viewed as an expansion of
wherein, as additional compensation, the employer paid income taxes
assessed against his employee; and as the taxpayer in Helvering v. Horst,
who detached interest coupons from bonds and delivered them to his
son, who later in the year at their maturity was paid the amount
thereof...
Id. at 1026 (citations omitted). A recent case involved assignment of income principles in which an attorney agreed to waive a forwarding fee of $408,318 in favor of his
sister in a medical malpractice action involving the sister's daughter. See Sutherland v.
Commissioner, T.Ct. Mem. § 96,001 No. 5780-92 (Jan. 2, 1996). The court held that
the attorney could not "avoid tax by an anticipatory arrangement that assigns income
earned by the taxpayer to another." Id.
122 See McEwen, 6 T.C. at 1026.
123 Sproull argued that he received only an equitable interest in the trust and not a
vested, possessory interest in an annuity contract as was true in earlier cases. Nevertheless, the court believed that the facts of Sproull presented a stronger case for taxability than other cases. The court emphasized that Sproull had to do nothing further
to earn or establish his rights to the money, no one else had any right to the money,
and he could assign his right in the interest created. The court held that the trust
conferred an "economic or financial benefit" on Sproull in 1945 equal to the amount
transferred. See Sproull 16 T.C. at 248-49.
124 The Sproull court stated:
[I] t must be held that the expenditure of the $10,500 in setting up the
trust conferred an economic or financial benefit on petitioner properly
taxable to him in 1945. The fund was ascertained and paid over by
petitioner's employer for his benefit in that year. Petitioner had to do
nothing further to earn it or establish his rights therein. The only duties of the trustee were to hold, invest, accumulate, and ...pay over the
fund... to petitioner or his estate .... No one else had any interest in
or control over the monies. The trust agreement contained no restriction whatever on petitioner's right to assign or otherwise dispose of the
interest thus created in him. On the facts here there is no doubt that
such an interest had a value equivalent to the amount paid over for his
benefit ....
Id. at 247-48.
125 See id. at 248. TheQSprouU court stated: "[I]t is... true that the amount which
the Commissioner has included in petitioner's income for 1945 was used in that year
for his benefit.., in setting up the trust of which petitioner.., was the sole beneficiary .
I..."
Id. at 247.
Moreover, the court explained that the issue became whether there was any ben-
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the doctrine of constructive receipt because a fund was "set apart
for the taxpayer" although the taxpayer did not have the power to
draw upon it. Sproull suggests an independent doctrine. By recognizing that something was irrevocably paid out for the taxpayer's
benefit, the court distinguished Sproull from cases where the
amount of compensation was subject to a future contingency or to
the possibility of return to the employer. 2 6
Perhaps the most important and distinct feature of Sproull is
that unlike other taxpayers, Sproull had taken no part in negotiating the transaction under which the trust was established. The fact
that taxation can occur without any involvement on the part of the
taxpayer strongly suggests that it is the nature of the right received
and not the arm's-length nature of the agreement that is determinative. It is unfortunate that Sproull's employer provided him with
taxable income1 2 7 but did not provide him with the funds to pay
the tax. Such action may force an employee to assign his interest
'
in the trust in order to pay the current tax. 28
In this regard,
efits conferred on the employee as compensation, either economic or financial. See
id.
The IRS adopted the principle of SproulL See Example 4 of Rev. Rul. 60-31, 19601 C.B. 174, 180. In the example, the taxpayer signed a football-player contract that
provided that his signing bonus be placed in an escrow with a bank and be paid to the
player over a five-year period. Citing Sproul4 the IRS ruling held the entire amount
taxable upon payment to the bank.
126 SprouU, 16 T.C. at 247.
127 An interesting case in the estate and gift area is Estate of DiMarco, in which the
Commissioner alleged that the decedent had made a taxable gift of an annuity established by the decedent's employer. Estate of DiMarco v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 653,
659 (1986). The court held that no gift had been made because the decedent had no
power over the selection of beneficiary under the annuity. See id. at 665. In discussing
whether a taxable event could occur without a volitional act by the donor, the court
stated:
While we agree with respondent that a taxable event may occur without
a volitional act by the donor, as in a case where an incomplete transfer
of property becomes complete because of the occurrence of an event
outside the donor's control, we do not believe that a taxable event can
occur for gift tax purposes unless there is first and in fact an act of
transfer by the donor; and there can be no act of transfer unless the act
is voluntary and the transferor has some awareness that he is in fact
making a transfer of property, that is, he must intend to do so.
Id. at 663.
128 The WarrenJones court rejected the hardship argument stating:
The Tax Court observed that requiring the taxpayer to realize the fair
market value of the contract in the year of the sale could subject the
taxpayer to substantial hardships. The taxpayer would be taxed in the
initial year on a substantial portion of its gain from the sale of the property, even though it had received, in cash, only a small fraction of the
purchase price. To raise funds to pay its taxes, the taxpayer might be
forced to sell the contract at the contract's fair market value, even
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Sproull is closely aligned with the cash equivalence doctrine.
Nevertheless, Sproull and Drescher stand for the proposition
that the economic value of nonforfeitable rights benefiting the taxpayer give rise to inclusion under the economic benefit doctrine
without regard to whether the taxpayer exercised any control,
before or after the rights are created. The flagrant violation of this
principle will be demonstrated by two cases.
B.

Cases Misapplying the Three Doctrines

Having described the three doctrines and explained how the
economic benefit doctrine expands the other two, it is clear that
two cases have grossly misapplied the doctrines. In both cases, the
court relied on the taxpayer's "bona fide arm's length" agreement
to justify unlimited deferral opportunities.
The first case, Reed v. Commissioner, misapplied all three doctrines. Reed is rarely cited but remains as implicit support for other
decisions such as Childs v. Commissioner. Reed has all the characteristics of Sproull; yet it arrived at a different result. In Reed, the constructive receipt and cash equivalence doctrines are narrowed to
near non-existence and the economic benefit doctrine is virtually
ignored. Although Reed is a 1983 case, it cites neither Sproull nor
Drescherdecided in 1952 and 1950, respectively.
In Childs, the court's overly technical application of the doctrines missed the critical issue of identifying the employer or principal obligor, thereby allowing the taxpayers to freely decide the
year of taxability. Childs did not cite Reed, which allowed the taxpayer broad discretion in determining the year of taxability.
1.

Reed v. Commissioner

In Reed v. Commissioner,129 Reed, a cash-method taxpayer,
agreed to sell common stock in a corporation to Cvengros in Nothough such a sale might not otherwise be necessary or advantageous.
Most importantly in the Tax Court's view, if the taxpayer were required
to realize the fair market value of the contract in the year of the sale, the
sale transaction would be closed for tax purposes in that year; hence,
the taxpayer's capital gain on the transaction would be permanently
limited to the difference between its adjusted basis and the contract's
fair market value plus the cash payments received in the year of sale. If
the taxpayer did retain the contract, so as to collect its face value, the
amounts received in excess of the contract's fair market value would
constitute ordinary income.
Warren Jones v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788, 790-91 (9th Cir. 1978).
129 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983), rev' 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 398 (1982).
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vember, 1973.130 The sale was to be closed before the end of
1973.11' Reed wanted to sell certain other assets and realize losses
that would offset the gain from the sale to Cvengros. 13 2 The offsetting loss transactions, however, could not be completed by the end
of 1973.'
Reed then negotiated an amendment to the sale agreement that provided that the purchase price would be deposited
into the escrow account on December 27, 1973, and disbursed by
the escrow holder to Reed on January 3, 1974.134 Accordingly,
Reed had no right to receive the sale proceeds until 1974. 13 The
deferred payment provision was negotiated as part of the purchase
agreement and was legally binding.13 6 No condition, other than
the passage of time, was placed on Reed's right to receive the escrow funds.
Reed claimed he was not required to report the gain on the
sale until 1974, when he received the sale proceeds from the escrow holder. 137 The Commissioner asserted 138 that Reed should
report the income in 1973, when the escrow holder received the
proceeds from the purchaser. 3 9 Reed urged that the escrow account was a valid income-deferral device because: (1) the account
was set up under a bona fide agreement between Reed and Cvengros deferring payment of the sales proceeds; (2) Reed was not
entitled to receive any incidental benefits from the escrow account;
and (3) the escrow holder was not Reed's agent. The Tax Court
agreed with the Commissioner reasoning that, because Reed could
dispose of his interest in the escrow fund (e.g. assign it to a third
person), Reed had constructively received the equivalent of the full
140
sales price.
After considering the application of the constructive receipt
doctrine as well as the economic benefit doctrine, the court of apSee
131 See
132 See
133 See
130

134

id. at 140.
id.
id. at 141.
id.

See Reed, 723 F.2d at 141.

135 See id.

136 See id.The court noted that "Cvengros, at his financial backer's insistence, was
initially unwilling to make the deferred payment but agreed to the escrow device after
Reed promised to remain on the Electromech Board of Directors following the sale to
insure a smooth ownership transition." Id. at 144.
137 See id.at 141.

138 The cash equivalence doctrine applied to sales of property prior to the extensive
amendments to I.R.C. § 453, which occurred in the 1980 Installment Sales Revision
Act.
139 See Reed, 723 F.2d at 149.
140 See id
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peals reversed."' According to the court, the constructive receipt
doctrine requires that income be recognized "when the taxpayer
1 42
has an unqualified, vested right to receive immediate payment."
The court explained, however, that because taxpayers have the
right to provide for deferred payment, such agreements and
amendments will be honored for tax purposes if made before payment is due. 143 The court articulated that the agreement and the
amendment are effective even if (1) the buyer is willing and able to
make immediate payment and (2) the taxpayer's primary objective
is to minimize taxes. 44 According to the Reed court, all that is required is that the parties intended "to be bound by the agreement
and were, in fact, legally bound."1 4' 5 Finding the escrow arrangement resulted from a "bona fide arm's length" agreement,' 4 6 the
court concluded that Reed never had an unconditional right to
receive payment in 1973, and thus, constructive receipt had not
147
occurred.
The Reed court relied on two decisions that allowed the deferral of income through the use of escrow arrangements. In the first
case, United States v. Busby, 148 a cotton farmer delivered cotton to a
gin for processing and sale. The proceeds of the sale were delivered to an escrow agent to be delivered to the taxpayer in the year
following the sale. The district court held for the Commissioner
but the Fifth Circuit reversed. The question on appeal involved a
jury finding that the gin owner was the agent of the purchaser and
not the taxpayer. The court of appeals upheld the jury finding and
141

See id.

See id. at 142; Metzer, supra note 36, at 531.
See Reed, 723 F.2d at 142; see also Schniers v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 511, 520
(1977) (upholding a farmer's claim that income was taxable in 1974 because the taxpayer was not required to contract for immediate payment and may contract for payment in a subsequent year); Amend v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 178,186 (1949)
(holding that the taxpayer/farmer could contract for payment in a subsequent year
even though the buyer was willing to make an immediate payment).
144 See id. at 143.
145 Id.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 149. If the payment had became due before the escrow arrangement
was agreed upon, the payment would have been constructively received. The court
distinguished an earlier case that involved the sale of timber, Williams v. United States,
219 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1955), on the basis that the escrow was unilaterally imposed after the timber purchaser's bid had been accepted and the purchaser had
offered to pay in full. Under such circumstances, the court found the timber seller
had constructively received the purchase price. Accordingly, the Reed court found the
escrow resulted from "a bona fide modification to the purchase-sale agreement."
Reed, 723 F.2d at 144.
148 679 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1982).
142

143
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held that the taxpayer had not received the purchase price in the
year of sale.
The Busby decision is often dismissed as a case addressing the
issue concerning standard of review.' 49 Nevertheless, the facts
demonstrate that the agreement with Busby required the escrow
deposit and that Busby did not receive any incidental benefit (e.g.
Such
interest or issuance of a letter of credit) from the escrow.'
facts were not determinative.
In the second case, Commissioner v. Tyler,15 ' the taxpayer tendered common stock into an escrow account in 1927 with the understanding that the securities would be purchased and the
purchase price paid in 1928 if eighty percent of the outstanding
stock in the corporation were tendered. The purchase price was
deposited in the escrow in 1927.12 Although the eighty percent
requirement was met and the securities delivered in 1927, the
purchase price was not paid until 1928. The Tyler court found that
the escrow was a "substantial limitation or restriction as to the time
or manner of payment,"1 5 3 which prevented receipt by the
See Charles E.Falk, Constructive Receipt and Economic Benefit: PuttingReed In the
TAX MAGAZINE, June 1984, at 425, 428. The Busby court concluded that the taxpayer did not reach the merits of the constructive receipt doctrine.
Falk explained:
The standard for reviewing a grant of a judgment n.o.v., however, is not
a finding of fact, but rather a finding that reasonable men could have
reached different conclusions. If so, the jury verdict should not be disturbed. Thus, the Fifth Circuit did not conclude that Busby was not in
constructive receipt, but rather that such a finding was reasonable.
Id.
150 The Busby court allowed a cotton grower to use an escrow to hold the proceeds
of sales in 1973 into the 1974 tax year. See Busby, 679 F.2d at 49. A concurring opinion by Judge Thornberry suggests that the question of constructive receipt was much
closer than the majority acknowledged. See id. at 50. Judge Thornberry, however,
joined the majority on the basis that the escrow arrangement provided no incidental
benefits to the seller in 1973. See id. The Judge compared the case with Williams v.
United States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955), where the taxpayers had received a letter of
credit based on the escrow. See id.
151 72 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1934).
152 The court discussed whether the escrow agent was the agent of the buyer or the
seller, and concluded that it was not the agent of the seller because the seller had no
control over the escrow agent.
153 See Tyler, 72 F.2d at 951-52, noting that Treas. Reg. § 74 reads:
Income which is credited to the account of or set apart for a taxpayer
and which may be drawn upon by him at any time is subject to tax for
the year during which so credited or set apart, although not then actually reduced to possession. To constitute receipt in such a case the income must be credited or set apart to the taxpayer without any substantial
limitation or restriction as to the time or manner of payment or condition
upon which payment is to be made, and must be made available to him
149

ProperPerspective, THE
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taxpayer.1 5 4
The Reed court followed Busby and Tyler and found that Reed's
deferred payment agreement prevented Reed from drawing upon
the proceeds so that the constructive receipt doctrine was inapplicable. Addressing the economic benefit doctrine, the Reed court
noted two conditions that were not present in Reed. First, the taxpayer received some present beneficial interest or "economic benefit" in the escrow account such as investment income or a letter of
credit.'5 5 Reed received no such income. Second, the escrows resulted from a "self-imposed limitation on funds
that the taxpayer
1 56
had an unqualified, vested right to control."
In Reed, the Commissioner argued that whenever a taxpayer
has an "unconditional right to future payment from an irrevocable
escrow account" income must be recognized. 5 v The Commissioner relied on Kuehner v. Commissioner 5 8 in which the taxpayer
placed fifty shares of stock in escrow in 1947 and the purchaser
deposited the full amount of the purchase price, $65,000. The escrow trustee in Kuehner agreed to distribute $13,000 annually to the
seller for five years. Interest earned on the funds went to the seller
and dividends on the stock reduced the purchase price. On these
facts the Kuehner court held that a single sale had taken place in
1947, rather than five separate sales over five years as argued by the
taxpayer.
To value the escrow rights, the court had to determine the fair
so that it may be drawn at any time, and its receipt brought within his
own control and disposition.
Id. (emphasis added).
154 See Robert J. McDonald, Deferred Compensation: ConceptualAstigmatism, 24 N.Y.U.
TAX L. REV. 201, 204 (1969) (explaining that "the central consideration is whether
the taxpayer's control of the time of its payment is subject to restrictions or
limitations").
155 In Goldsmith, the court limited the economic benefit doctrine to benefits that
are capable of current valuation. Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 586 F.2d 810, 821-22
(Ct. Cl. 1978). The Goldsmith court stated:
The economic benefit doctrine does not depend for its applicability on
whether the employee could have received cash by stretching out his
hand. It is based on the theory that the promise to pay deferred compensation in the future in and of itself under certain circumstances may
constitute an economic benefit or the equivalent of cash to be taxed
currently at present value, if it can be valued currently with some
exactness.
Id. at 820. Goldsmith held that certain insurance features or the deferred compensation plan could be valued, but that the retirement feature could not. See id. at 821-22.
156 Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 142 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'g45 T.C.M. (CCH)
398 (1982).
157 See id. at 146.
158 214 F.2d 437 (1st Cir.), afg 20 T.C. 875 (1953).
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market value of the property Kuehner received.' 5 9 Because there
was a "high degree of certainty" that Kuehner would receive the
entire $65,000 within four and one-half years, the court determined he had realized the entire amount in 1947.160
It is not clear whether the Kuehner court applied the economic
benefit doctrine or cash equivalence principles1 6 1 because the
court acknowledged that the deposit could be considered the
"equivalent of cash."' 62 This was not a mere promise to pay, but a
deposit irrevocably set aside for taxpayer's sole benefit. No condition attached to the payment other than the passage of time, and
no further performance was required by the buyer or seller.
Nevertheless, the Reed court rejected the Commissioner's interpretation of Kuehner.163 First, according to the Reed court,
Kuehner held that an escrow deposit would only be "equivalent to
cash" if the taxpayer had a present interest in the deposit such as
the right to receive interest. Second, the court stated that to read
Kuehner broadly would undermine deferred payment arrangements
as effective methods of deferring income. 164 Finally, the court concluded that a broad reading would erode the distinction between
cash and accrual methods of accounting.
In its application to compensation cases, the Reed court saw
the "economic benefit" doctrine as primarily an inquiry into
whether the benefit has an ascertainable fair market value. 165 The
159 For example, see I.R.C. § 1001(a)-(b) (1986). Gain on the sale is the amount
realized over the adjusted basis. The amount realized is the sum of money received
plus the fair market value of property.
160 Presumably the interest on the escrowed funds, which was paid to the seller,
reflected a market rate. Thus, time-value-of-money considerations would not be relevant and the only question was whether there was any significant risk that the principle would not be paid. If interest were not paid on the deposit, the promise would be
equivalent to an original issue discount and the present value of the five $13,000

payments (using a six percent discount rate for payments in arrears) would be
$54,761.
161 See Kuehner, 214 F.2d at 440. The Kuehnercourt referenced both the cash equiv-

alence and economic benefit doctrines. See id. Moreover, Falk concluded, "The First
Circuit [in Kuehner] affirmed the Tax Court's holding by emphasizing the fair market

value of the trust account, not its cash equivalence." Falk, supra note 149, at 449.
162 See id.

163 The Reed court cited the following language from Kuehner as suggestive of a
broad interpretation of the doctrine of economic benefit: "Under the terms of the
1947 agreement the interest from the invested [escrow fund] was payable to the petitioner. The Trustee's duties were ministerial and the economic benefits of the [escrow] fund held by it belonged to the [taxpayer]"
723 F.2d at 146 (quoting Kuehner, 214 F.2d at 440).

164 See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.

165 Reed, 723 F.2d at 147; Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 586 F.2d 810, 820 (Ct. Cl.

1978). See generally Metzer, supra note 36, at 500-51.
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court felt that such a narrow inquiry would be inappropriate in
areas other than compensation and held that the inquiry must go
"beyond" the question of fair market value to the question of
whether the contract right was the equivalent of cash. To determine whether the agreement in Reed met the cash equivalence test,
the court invoked the test of Cowden v. Commissioner.166 Recall that
Cowden required that the promise of payment be readily transferable in commerce and intended as payment. Because Reed's escrow
rights did not meet these tests, the court found that the escrow was
not a cash equivalent. Interestingly, the court characterized the
rights as "added assurance that payment would be made next
167
year."
The court responded to the argument that Reed's interest
should be taxed because it was assignable by asserting that assignability was not determinative. 168 Allowing the question to turn on
assignability would undermine deferred payment arrangements as
effective methods of deferring income.1 6 9 Because Reed made no
attempt to assign the escrow funds, the court felt he "did nothing
to charge himself with any economic benefit derived from the
funds."1 7 0
The court responded to the Commissioner's argument that
the escrow agent was Reed's agent and thus the escrow was selfimposed, by stating that the escrow was the result of a bona fide
modification to the purchase agreement, which required both the
seller's and Reed's approval. 171 The court also rejected the Commissioner's argument that an agency resulted because the funds
would eventually benefit Reed. According to the court, such a rule
would invalidate any escrow that deferred payment. 172
289 F.2d 20 (1961).
Reed, 723 F.2d at 148; see also Freidhoff, supranote 84, at 1013 (arguing that the
escrow in Reed meets the Cowden standards and because the deferral period is only
seven days, the escrow would not require a significant discount).
168 The opposite result was reached in United States v. Drescher, where the court
found that an economic benefit occurred. 179 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1950).
Although the court spoke in terms of non-assignability, it alluded to a clause in the
policy allowing for any beneficiary named by the taxpayer at the time the contract was
executed to receive the cost of each contract, plus interest at the death of the taxpayer. See id. at 866. This clause scratches the surface of "assignability."
169 Reed, 723 F.2d at 148.
166
167

170 See

id.

Burke and Friel state: "A definition of the substantive difference between the
ineffective 'self-imposed limitation' and effective bona fide arm's-length substantial
limitation may be elusive, particularly when one recalls that deferral may be the objective of the seller alone."
172 One commentator has asserted:
[Tjhe cases cited in Reed do not really support this conclusion. Further171
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Critical Analysis of Reed

The First Circuit's analysis in Reed is flawed in a number of
respects. First, its interpretation of the constructive receipt doctrine is incorrect because it expanded the concept of a "substantial
limitation and restriction" to include any limitation on the time of
payment so long as the parties intended to and, in fact, did agree
to such limitation.1 73 Second, the court virtually eliminated application of the economic benefit doctrine outside the deferred compensation area by requiring a showing of cash equivalence. 1 74 The
key to the economic benefit doctrine is to apply the principles of
more, the opinion is absurd in principle because the taxpayer's nonentitlement to earnings on the escrow fund affected only the amount of
the funds' present value to the taxpayer; nonentitlement to earnings
did not prevent the value of the taxpayer's unconditional interest in the
fund from being a current economic benefit to him. Clearly, when the
taxpayer received a nonforfeitable right to the escrow fund.., he obtained something of value that he had not owned previously and that
was materially different from a mere promise to pay. .

.

. The Reed

court's folly created a wonderful windfall for the taxpayer and a corresponding cost to the Treasury ....Reed can appropriately be held up as
an example of the dumb things that courts are capable of doing when
they mechanically apply precedent while ignoring the statute and the
structure of tax law.
JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, FEDERAL INCOME TAx DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND PoLicY 256-57 (1995).
173 Falk concludes that Reed reached the correct result on constructive receipt but
for the wrong reason. Falk states, "The First Circuit missed the issue ...[i]t was not
that the limitation was self-imposed, but rather that it was imposed after the taxpayer
was in constructive receipt." Falk, supra note 149, at 428. It would seem Falk's reasoning is circular because by definition any restriction imposed after constructive receipt is self-imposed.
174 See Burke & Friel supra note 60, at 262-63. Falk purports that the Reed court
failed to "distinguish between the taxability of a cash basis taxpayer who receives income without the sale of property and the taxability of one who receives income from
the sale of property." Falk, supra note 149, at 430. Falk explains that the point of
taxation is different. See id. Falk suggests that in sales of property the only question is
the fair market value of the consideration received, whereas in deferred payment service transactions the question is whether what is received is a cash equivalent. See
Gertzman, supra note 20, at 68. Suggesting that the fair market value is the sole consideration in property transactions, Falk states:
[I] t has long been held that a taxpayer who receives fully vested funds in
a trust or escrow account where the availability of such funds is only a
function of time is regarded as receiving gross income. This is not because the taxpayer received a cash equivalent, but because he has received property that can be assigned, factored or hypothecated.... This
is the essence of the economic benefit doctrine. If the taxpayer received property it is included in the amount realized.... It is difficult to
imagine that Reed did not receive a valuable economic benefit, and
hence property. ...
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Revenue Ruling 60-31 beyond deferred compensation arrangements to sales and other situations.
The first flaw is that by interpreting the regulation that income be set apart "so that the taxpayer could have drawn upon it"
as requiring an "unqualified, vested right to immediate payment,"
the court requires that the income be virtually in the taxpayer's
hand before it is constructively received. 175 Further, it practically
eliminates the regulation that income is "not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial
limitations or restrictions."1 76 Reed's analysis seems to be that any
limitation is substantial so long as it is imposed by agreement
before constructive receipt occurs.
Reed involved a seven-day limitation. It represented a loss of
seven days of interest on $266,000, but in return Reed delayed paying his $71,412 tax for one year. If Reed could invest the deferred
taxes at six percent after taxes, he would have lost $306 in interest
for the seven days while making $4285 interest on the delayed tax
payment. Economically, Reed's limitation created a lucrative investment opportunity.
Even if the escrow were a limitation on Reed's ability to obtain
the funds, the question remains whether it was "substantial." The
regulations contemplate that only substantial limitations on a taxpayer's control prevent constructive receipt. Should a seven-day
delay be considered substantial when there is little or no chance
that Reed will not receive the funds? The Reed court seems to think
any time limitation is "substantial." But "substantial" refers to the
substance, not merely the form of the limitation. In other words, is
the limitation "real?"1 7 7 Perhaps the question should be whether
the limitation involves some "risk" that the funds will not be paid to
the beneficiary.1 7 8
175 Burke and Friel note "that Reed, without objection from anyone, could have
prevailed upon the escrowee to deliver the escrowed funds to him or to his assignee
prior to January 3, 1974." Burke & Friel, supra note 60, at 260.
176 See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (a) (as amended in 1979).
177 Substantial is defined as:
[o]f*real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable. Belonging to substance; actually existing; real; not seeming or imaginary;
not illusive; solid; true; veritable. Something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal. Synonymous
with material.
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 996 (6th ed. 1991) (citations omitted).
178 SeeYosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 494, 499-500 (7th Cir. 1988) (suggesting
that where market risks are eliminated from transactions, the transactions lack economic substance and become "artifices created by accomplices in tax evasion, the
brokers."); Kuehner v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 437, 441 (1954), aff'g 20 T.C. 875
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The two clauses of the regulation should be read together so
that a "substantial limitation or restriction" must be found before
an escrow can be used to defeat the constructive receipt of the income. 7 9 In the context of a sale of a business, escrows are commonly used to secure warranty provisions thereby insuring the
purchaser of the business of a fund to charge if the warranties are
breached.1 8 1 Whether a limitation is substantial may focus on
whether someone other than the seller has an interest in the escrow that limits the seller's control of the funds."8 ' An affirmative
answer indicates that constructive receipt may not have occurred
whereas a negative answer suggests the opposite result.
The Commissioner in Reed relied on Williams v. United States,'" 2

in which the seller imposed an escrow arrangement after the contract to sell timber was executed and the buyer had agreed to pay
cash. 3 The Reed court viewed Williams as involving a self-imposed
escrow,1 84 whereas in Reed there was a modification to the contract
(1953) (holding that because there was a degree of certainty that the entire escrow
amount would be paid, the court did not discount the amount for the purposes of
income recognition).
179 The existence of a substantial restriction is a question of fact. See Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.83-3(c) (as amended in 1985), 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979). Scott indicates
that under I.R.C. § 83:
A substantial risk may exist where ownership depends on the performance of future services, noncompetition, or the occurrence of a condition related to the purpose of the transfer. Since the employer's state of
mind is relevant, an otherwise adequate condition does not constitute a
substantial risk if it seems unlikely that the employer would insist on
enforcement.
Scott, supra note 6, at 31-32.
180 See Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569, 577 (1971) (distinguishing cases where
the escrow was used to secure warranties).
181 Scott posits that under I.R.C. § 83(c)(1) (1988) and Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c) (1)(c) (2) (1985) "[a] substantial risk may exist where ownership depends on . . . the
occurrence of a condition related to the purpose of the transfer." Scott, supra note 6,
at 31-32.
182 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955).
183

The Williams court stated:
We cannot agree ... that the means adopted here had the legal effect

claimed.... This is so for two reasons. The first is... that when the
lumber company's bid was accepted, and it desired and offered to comply with it by paying the full purchase price, the taxpayers were then in
constructive receipt of it, and that the self imposed limitation of the
escrow device did not in fact and in law change the situation so as to
make the funds any less available to, and constructively received by
them.
184 Id. at 526.
See Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 146 (1st Cir. 1983), revg 45 T.C.M.
(CCH) 398 (1982). Reed likewise dismissed Oden v. Commissioner on the basis that it
was self-imposed. A more accurate reflection of Oden, however, is that the court

106

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:70

imposing the escrow prior to payment becoming due, which prevented constructive receipt.
The court's reasoning does not explain why the Williams court
did not find a similar modification since the timber buyer in Williams had an agreement to pay cash. The answer is that the Reed
court accepted the form without looking at the substance. In both
Williams and Reed, the escrow was solely for the benefit of seller,
had a clear unilateral flavor, was imposed without consideration,
and terminated the buyer's entire interest in the funds deposited
85
in the escrow.1

The second flaw in Reed is its analysis of the economic benefit
doctrine. Reed suggests that a distinguishing feature1 8 6 of economic benefit is the receipt of some present beneficial interest
such as investment income,1 87 a letter of credit,1 88 or interest in-

come, i s° none of which was present in Reed. The receipt of interest
or other current benefit was not considered crucial in economic
benefit cases such as Drescher, Sproull or Kuehner, notwithstanding

the Reed court's assertion that it determined the outcome in
Kuehner. While the Kuehner court recognized that interest accrual
and assignability supported a finding that the cash equivalence
doctrine applied, the thrust of the opinion was the irrevocable setting aside of funds and the binding precedent of the Sproull decision that forced the court to include the funds in Kuehner's
found that the escrow had no economic substance. For this reason, the court held
that the funds had been received upon the closing of the sale. In this regard, Reed is
indistinguishable from Oden and should have followed that decision.
A better formulation is that the escrow was imposed after the taxpayer was in
constructive receipt of the funds. Falk states:
[t]his is a crucial distinction since receipt-actual or constructive-is
the point of taxation for a cash basis taxpayer, and, after the right to
receive ripens to receipt, no arrangement can alter the taxability.
Although arriving at the correct result, the First Circuit missed the issue.
In Williams it was not that the limitation was self-imposed, but rather
that it was imposed after the taxpayer was in constructive receipt.
185 Falk, supra note 149, at 428.
The Reed court's finding of consideration for the deferral in Reed's agreement to
stay on the board for a period of time is not convincing because the buyer severed all
ties to the funds upon deposit in the escrow. Reed, 723 F.2d at 141.
186 A second distinguishing feature noted in Reed is that many economic benefit
cases included self-imposed restrictions. Such restrictions are more pertinent under
the constrictive receipt doctrine and are analyzed above. See Williams v. United States,
219 F.2d 523, 527 (1955); Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569, 575 (1971).
187 See Kuehner v. United States, 214 F.2d 437, 440-41 (1954), afJ'g 20 T.C. 875
(1953).
188 See Watson v. United States, 613 F.2d 591, 597 (1980).
189 See Pozzi v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 119, 120 (1967).

1996]

ECONOMIC BENEFIT DOCTRINE

107

income 19°
The Reed court's requirement that the taxpayer receive some
present, beneficial interest in the fund is specious. 191 The court
suggests that had Reed received investment interest on the funds
deposited in the escrow (estimated at $306), he would have realized the $266,000 gain in 1973. Determining whether receipt has
occurred by asking whether the taxpayer is entitled to the investment interest is not sustainable. Binding the Commissioner to
such mechanical rules elevates form over substance. 19 2 Taxability
should be determined by the economic substance of the arrangement and not merely the form.19 The economic reality is that
Reed's escrowed purchase price is more secure than the letter of
credit,' 9 4 which caused income recognition in the Watson case also
5
cited by Reed.

19

190 The Commissioner argued that even if a present beneficial interest was required, Reed had received such an interest by virtue of his right to assign his right to
receive payment under the agreement. The court rejected this argument stating:
"[t]o base the economic benefit rule on whether a taxpayer could have assigned his
contractual right to future payment would eviscerate the well recognized rule that a
taxpayer can defer income recognition pursuant to a bona fide deferred payment
agreement." Reed, 723 F.2d at 148. Moreover, Falk states:
[iut has long been held that a taxpayer who receives fully vested funds in
a trust or escrow account where the availability of such funds is only a
function of time is regarded as receiving gross income. This is not because the taxpayer has received a cash equivalent, but because he has
received property that can be assigned, factored or hypothecated. He is
taxable just as if he had received insurance coverage, an automobile, a
boat or other valuable remuneration. This is the essence of the economic benefit doctrine. . . . It is difficult to imagine that Reed did not
receive a valuable economic benefit, and hence property, where funds
were irrevocably deposited for him in 1973 in an escrow account to be
disbursed a week later. This was the implication of the Tax Court's
opinion in Reed, and should have been affirmed by the First Circuit.
191 Falk, supra note 149, at 430.
Oden involved an escrow inwhich the buyer received interest from certificates of
deposit in the escrow and did not pay interest on the note given to the seller as evidence of debt. The Oden court recognized that the purchase price could easily be
adjusted to reflect unstated interest and that it was the substance and not the form
that determined taxation. Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569, 575 (1971).
192 See Burke & Friel, supra note 60, at 262.
193 See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (as amended in 1995).
194 See Burke & Friel, supra note 60, at 261.
195 The Watson court rejected formalistic arguments that a letter of credit securing
the future payment of the purchase price of cotton did not meet the Cowden standards
of cash equivalence. Watson v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 1980). The
taxpayer argued that he did not have control over the income because the letter of
credit was not unconditional, assignable, or readily marketable. See id. at 597-98. The
court rejected these arguments as elevating form over substance and included the
value of the letter of credit in income when issued. See id. at 599. It stated that "a
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Reed's other two arguments against Kuehner are not convincing.
First, reading Kuehner broadly would not undermine deferred payment arrangements because such arrangements are based on the
proposition that unsecured promises to pay in the future are not
current income. Such promises are general obligations of the
promisor. In Kuehner, as in other economic benefit cases, there is a
setting aside of assets away from the claims of creditors. That funds
cease to be subject to the seller's creditors is a critical feature of
Drescher and Sproull and the primary justification for deferral in
compensation situations.1 96
Second, Reed's rejection of Kuehner because the distinction between cash and accrual-method accounting would be eroded is unfounded. The reason for preserving the cash method is to
maintain its simplicity. The simplicity is lost if taxpayers are permitted to use escrow accounts lacking economic substance to successfully defer income.
Although Reed is frequently cited by commentators, none of
the cases citing Reed has followed its holding with regard to the
escrow. Looking at situations in terms of economic realities as demanded by the economic benefit doctrine and as suggested by
Judge Clark in his dissent in Drescher, is a far better approach to
analyzing these situations.1 97 In fact, such an approach is "necessary to maintain the integrity of [S]ection 61 as well as the annual
accounting system. " "'
3.

Childs v. Commissioner

In Childs v. Commissioner, 99 a law firm, which consisted of atcommercial instrument is 'unconditional' when, under local law, the obligation cannot be avoided or modified without the consent of the obligee." Id. at 597.
Applying "objective economic realities" the court concluded the letter of credit
was assignable and that a ready market existed because it could be used for collateral
on a loan. See id. at 598. Although the taxpayer did not know letters of credit could
be used for collateral, the court stated: "[e]conomic realities, not tax motives, must
govern in determining whether income is properly taxable in a given year." Id. at 599.
196 See generally Robinson v. Commissioner, 44 T. C. 20 (1965); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-13107 (Dec. 31, 1980).
197 See Watson, 613 F.2d at 520.
198 Burke & Friel, supra note 60, at 263.
199 The tort claims arose out of a 1984 explosion which resulted in the death of
Willie JamesJones and serious injuries tojermeral C. Garrett (Garrett), the minor son
of Annette Jones (Jones). Garrett andJones retained the law firm Swearingen, Childs
& Philips under the following fee arrangement: "33 1/3 percent of the gross amount
recovered in the litigation if the case was settled before the suit was tried, and 40
percent of any gross amount recovered if the case was settled after the suit was
tried .. " See Childs v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 634, 654 (1994), affd, 89 F.3d 356
(11th Cir. 1996). Actions were brought against Columbus Propane Gas Service, Inc.
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torneys Childs, Phillips and Swearingen, settled two personal injury
cases. The settlements provided for an initial payment to the plaintiffs as well as periodic payments over a number of years in the
future, commonly called a "structured settlement." The tort defendants' insurance company gave each of three lawyers options
for the payment of their respective portions of the legal fees. Each
attorney selected a different payment arrangement with one attorney collecting his entire fee within six months while another received lifetime payments. The attorneys reported the fees as the
payments were received.
In March 1986, a tentative settlement was reached providing
for a $240,000 initial payment to the plaintiff, Garrett, a minor,
plus structured payments. 20 0 The structured payment obligation
was assigned by the defendant's insurance carrier (the Primary Insurer) to a second insurer (the Payment Obligor) 2° 1 although the
Primary Insurer would remain primarily liable for the amounts
owed. The Primary Insurer paid the Payment Obligor an amount
sufficient to purchase annuities to fund the payments.
Because Garrett was a minor, the attorneys consulted with the
State Bar of Georgia regarding the appropriate amount and
method of payment of attorneys' fees. The State Bar advised that
the attorneys could receive a fee at the time of settlement equal to
a percentage of the present value of the Garrett settlement. 20 2 Attorney Phillips expressed a desire to receive his fee immediately
but Mr. Bradford objected to immediate payment as did Mrs. Jones
who stated "that she did not want the attorneys to receive their fee
immediately, if she and Garrett were to take a structured settlement."20 Before the settlement was finalized the parties agreed
(Columbus Propane) for negligence. The cases were referred to Columbus Propane's insurance carrier (the Primary Insurer), which retained Charles S. Bradford of
Structured Annuity Settlements, Inc. to negotiate a settlement.
200 The decision does not indicate whether the payments will continue for a specified period or for Garrett's life.
201 The company responsible for making payments to the attorneys under the Garrett settlement was First Executive Corporation, which funded the attorneys' fees
under the Garrett settlement, by purchasing an annuity from its subsidiary Executive
Life Insurance Company. The company responsible for making payments to the attorneys under the Jones settlement was Manulife Service Corporation, which funded
the attorneys' fees under the Jones settlement by purchasing an annuity from Manufacturers Life Insurance Company. For purposes of this article, the persons responsible for the payment to the attorneys will be referred to as "Payment Obligor."
202 A percentage of the present value of the Garrett settlement was then used to
purchase the annuity for the attorneys.
203 The logic of Mrs. Jones's assertion is not convincing because there is a clear tax
reason for Garrett and Jones to accept structured settlements; a reason that is not
applicable to the attorneys. The entire amount of the payments are excluded from
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that legal fees would be paid in a structured format and each attorney selected a different payment schedule that was made a part of
the settlement agreement. Attorney Phillips requested annual payments in 1987 and 1988; Childs requested a combination of
monthly and annual payments terminating in 1999; and Swearingen requested annual payments through 2001. The present value
of all payments, calculated at a six percent annual rate of interest,
was $336,329.204
The settlement agreement was approved by the district court
and by an Alabama state court on behalf of the Alabama minor.
The Payment Obligor purchased annuities to fund the obligations,
naming the attorneys as annuitants. Under the Garrett's settlement agreement, the annuitants could not accelerate, defer, increase, or reduce the payments to their present value.2 °5 The
Payment Obligor was the owner of the annuities and had the right
20 6
to change the beneficiary.
The attorneys brought suit on behalf of Garrett's mother, Mrs.
Jones, in 1986, and the case proceeded in the same manner as the
Garrett case. In the fall of 1987, a settlement was reached whereby
Mrs. Jones received an immediate lump sum payment 20 7 together
with structured payments. 2°s Again, the attorneys were allowed to
select the method in which their fees were paid, 2 9 and again the
selections were made a part of the final agreement with Mrs. Jones.
Attorney Phillips requested monthly payments commencing in
gross income under I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) thereby exempting any investment income resulting from the deferred payment. This benefit is not afforded to the attorneys representing the injured person.
204 See the table of payments in Exhibit A of the Appendix.
205 The parties to the settlement each signed an assignment and assumption agreement assigning the Primary Insurer's payment obligation to the Payment Obligor.
Paragraph five of the assignment, which qualified under I.R.C. § 130, provided in
part:
The parties to this Agreement agree (1) that any periodic payments
hereunder shall not be capable of being accelerated, deferred, increased, or decreased by Jones, Hood, Garrett or any other recipient
hereunder and (2) that said persons, or any other recipient hereunder,
shall not have, by reason of this Agreement, any right against [the Payment Obligor] other than the rights of a general creditor.
Childs v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 634, 643 (1994), aff'd, 89 F.3d 356 (lth Cir. 1996).
206 See id. at 643-44.
207 Mrs.Jones was paid an immediate lump sum of $464,431, from which she paid
certain claims against Mr. Jones's estate and legal fees. The portion paid to the attorneys under the lump sum was not in dispute.
208 The decision does not indicate whether the payments are for Mrs. Jones's life.
209 See Appendix B for description of payments to be made to Attorneys Childs,
Phillips, and Swearingen.
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1992 and continuing for the remainder of his life; Childs requested
payments in January and April 1988; and Swearingen requested
monthly payments commencing in 1988 and continuing for the remainder of his life. The present value of all payments, calculated
at a six percent annual rate of interest, was $418,729.21 °
The obligation of the Primary Insurer for the structured payments was assigned to the Payment Obligor, although the Primary
Insurer remained secondarily liable for the payments. In October
1987, the Primary Insurer paid $536,069 to the Payment Obligor to
purchase three annuities to "fund" the structured payments to the
attorneys. The Primary Insurer was named as owner of these annuities and had authority to change the beneficiary of the policies.21 1
Attorneys Childs, Phillips, and Swearingen reported only
amounts actually received from the settlements. The Commissioner determined under I.R.C. § 83, the attorneys should have included the fair market value of the Garrett annuities in 1986 and
the Jones annuities in 1987. As the basis for his argument, the
Commissioner asserted that the attorneys had constructively
re21 2
settlement.
of
year
the
in
annuities
the
of
value
ceived the
The court first addressed the Commissioner's argument that
the attorneys' fees constituted property transferred in connection
with the performance of services to be included under § 83. 21 To
See the table of payments in Exhibit B of the Appendix.
The beneficiary of the Childs's annuity could only be changed during Childs's
lifetime.
212 In a 1993 private letter ruling, Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 93-36-001 (May 12, 1993), the Commissioner addressed a similar situation and concluded that I.R.C. § 83 applied because the tort plaintiff had set aside a portion of the recovery for the attorneys. The
ruling found that this action constituted a funding of the obligation, which thereby
fell into the definition of property. Supporting this conclusion, the ruling cites Rev.
Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172; Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1
C.B. 174; and Rev. Rul. 55-691, 1955-2 C.B. 21, all of which relied on Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), affid, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952).
The Commissioner concluded the debt for attorneys' fees was "secured" because
state regulatory law requires that insurance companies maintain reserves and have a
priority over general creditors of the insurance carriers. He also concluded that because substantially all of the services owed to the client were performed before the
deferred payment arrangement was determined and because the insurers were
"ready, willing, and able to pay the taxpayer his fees in cash" that the attorneys had
constructively received the fees when the annuities were purchased.
213 I.R.C. § 83 (1986) provides:
(a).General Rule.-If, in connection with the performance of services,
property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom
such services are performed, the excess of (1) the fair market value of such property (determined without regard
to any restriction other than a restriction which by its terms will never
lapse) at the first time the rights of the person having the beneficial
210
211
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decide whether the promise to pay attorneys' fees under the Garrett and Jones settlements and the corresponding annuities constituted I.R.C. § 83 "property," the Tax Court focused on the
definition of property that excluded unfunded and unsecured
promises to pay in the future.2 1 4
Because the term "funded" is not defined in the Code or the
regulations, 2 15 the court sought assistance from the holdings in
three Tax Court cases. First, Sproull v. Commissioner 16 included the
taxpayer's interest in a trust fund in the year the employer transferred moneys to the trust, since the taxpayer was the owner of the
economic and financial benefit conferred when the trust was created. Next, in Centre v. Commissioner1 7 an insurance policy
purchased by an employer to fund a deferred compensation obligation was not taxable to the employee at the time the premiums
were paid by the employer because the employer remained both
the owner and the beneficiary of the policy. Finally, in Minor v.
interest in such property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier, over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property, shall be included in the
gross income of the person who performed such services in the first
taxable year in which the rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever is applicable....
See MCDANIEL, supra note 56, at 1079-99. I.R.C. § 83 was enacted to deal with situations previously addressed by the economic benefit doctrine.
214 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985) provides:
[T]he term 'property' includes real and personal property other than
either money or an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or property
inthe future. The term also includes a beneficial interest in assets (including money) which are transferred or set aside from the claims of
creditors of the transferor, for example, in a trust or escrow account....
Id. (emphasis added).
215 Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), an exemption
for so-called "top hat plans" requires that such plans be "unfunded," which generally
means that the plan assets are subject to the employer's creditors. Moreover, Scott
notes:
The plan must be unfunded. Legislative materials do not suggest an
approach to the funding issue, and courts have dealt with the question
simply by examining the details of each particular plan. Labor takes the
position that decisions are to be based on an examination of the facts
and circumstances including the status of the plan under non-ERISA
law.... Labor apparently will continue to follow the IRS approach that
treats a plan as unfunded so long as the assets remain subject to claims
of the employer's creditors.
Scott, supra note 6, at 9 (footnotes omitted).
216 See Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244, 245 (1951), affid, 194 F.2d 541 (6th
Cir. 1952); see also United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding that an economic benefit was conferred upon the purchase of an annuity).
217 55 T.C. 16, 20 (1970)
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United States"'8 a physician designated that a percentage of his fees
be placed in a trust fund for future distribution. Because the employer was the settlor and beneficiary of the trust and because the
funds were not secured from the employer's creditors,"1 9 the court
held that "no amount of ascertainable value had been conferred"
on the physician that could be taxed.2 2 °
Taking the cases together, the Childs court held that funding
does not occur as long as the obligor remains the owner of the
trust funds and it remains subject to the general creditors of the
obligor.2 2 Accordingly, because the owner of the Garrett and
Jones annuities had power to change the beneficiary 2 22 and the
payments could not be "accelerated, deferred, increased, or decreased," the court concluded that the promises to the attorneys
were not funded.22 3
The Court then addressed the Commissioner's argument that
the guarantees by the insurance companies caused the promises to
be secured. As a result, the Commissioner asserted that the lien for
attorneys' fees, and the Georgia requirement that insurance companies maintain reserves, constituted secured interests. 224 The Tax
Court responded by stating that a simple guarantee alone does not
render a promise secured, because a guarantee is by definition a
promise to pay.225 The Tax Court concluded that the agreements
by the insurance companies were unfunded and unsecured
promises for future payment and did not constitute property under
I.R.C. § 83.226 Accordingly, the future payments were not includible in the taxpayer's income under I.R.C. § 83.227
The Tax Court next addressed the Commissioner's argument
218 772 F.2d 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1985).

219 See Scott, supra note 6, at 10 n.93 (explaining that the key question in so-called
"rabbi" trusts is whether the assets in the trust are subject to the claims of the general
creditors of the obligor).
220 See Minor, 772 F.2d at 1476. Cooper, supra note 69, at 247, sharply criticizes
Minor, noting that the "slavish acceptance of the trust instrument's designation of the

corporation as the beneficiary of the arrangement appears to exalt form at the expense of substance."
221 Childs v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 634, 651 (1994), aff'd, 89 F.3d 356 (11th Cir.
1996).

222 See id. at 644. The right to change beneficiaries terminated upon the death of

the applicable attorney.
223 See id. at 651.
224 See id. at 652.

225 See id. at 652 (citing Berry v. United States, 760 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1985), affg per
curiam,593 F. Supp. 80, 85 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Brand v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 821, 828
(1983)).
226 See Childs, 103 T.C. at 653.
227 See id.
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that the taxpayers had constructively received the amount paid for
the annuities in the year. of purchase. The court noted that a taxpayer constructively receives income when he has an "unqualified,
vested right to receive immediate payment."2 28 Because the attorneys did not become entitled to their fees until the settlement
agreements were binding and judgment was entered, 229 they never
had the right to receive immediate payment 2 30 and, thus, had not
constructively received the proceeds.2 3 1
The result of the Childs decision is that the rights and benefits
received by the attorneys under the settlement agreements were
not sufficiently established to be included in gross income.
4.

Critical Analysis of Childs

The Childs court rejected the application of the constructive
receipt doctrine as well as the economic benefit doctrine 2 2 be228 See id. at 654 (quoting Martin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 814, 823 (1991)); Reed
v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 142 (1st. Cir. 1983), rev' 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 398
(1982).
229 See Childs, 103 T.C. at 637-38. The court also noted that under the attorney's fee
arrangement, the attorneys were to receive a percentage of the amount "recovered"
for the client. See id. at 637. The term "recovered" suggested that the fee was only
earned when an amount was actually received by the client. Again, since the structured fee arrangement was agreed upon before the clients "recovered" any amount,
no money or property was made available to the taxpayer attorneys, and accordingly,
constructive receipt did not occur upon settlement of the cases.
230 See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 179 (acknowledging that deferral arrangements for unearned royalties made prior to the time the royalties are earned will be
taxed only upon payment to the cash basis taxpayer).
231 See Childs, 103 T.C. at 655. The court cited Oates v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 570
(1952), affd, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953). In Oates, the taxpayer had modified the
schedule for payment of insurance commissions after retirement to spread the payments over a longer period than originally provided. See 18 T.C. at 572. The Commissioner argued that modification could not delay the taxability of the commissions. See
id. at 585. The Commissioner's initial nonacquiescence in Oates (nonacq., 1952-2 C.B.
5) was later withdrawn (nonacq. withdrawn and acq. substituted, 1960-2 C.B. 6).
In a case not cited, Commissionerv. Olmsted Inc. Life Agency, 304 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.
1962). affig 35 T.C. 429 (1960), an insurance agency terminated its agency contract
and assigned its right to renewal commissions to the insurer in exchange for a 15-year
annuity issued by the insurer. Olmsted, 304 F.2d at 18. Relying on Oates, the court
held that the exchange was not a "sale or other disposition" of the agency contract
under I.R.C. § 1001, but was a novation that deferred the income. See id. at 20. The
Commissioner argued that Oates did not apply because, in Olmsted, the taxpayer's contract rights were assignable and the insurer would have paid cash immediately. See id.
at 19. In Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 85-25-003 (Mar. 4, 1985), the IRS suggested that Olmsted stood
for the proposition that a taxable disposition depends on whether the new contract
differs materially in kind from the old contract. The IRS filed a nonacquiescence in
Olmsted, 1961-2 C.B. 6. See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 31, at 720.
232 Childs, 103 T.C. at 655. The Childs court acknowledged the economic benefit
doctrine. See id. at 649. The doctrine is often considered an exception or an alterna-
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cause the structured settlement had been agreed to prior to the
settlement becoming final.2"3 Accordingly, the attorneys never had
the right to demand immediate payment. The doctrine of cash
equivalence did not apply either, since the attorneys could not assign the right to future payments and obtain an immediate cash
payment. Because the payments were unsecured promises of the
insurance company and the insurance company's assets remained
subject to the rights of its creditors, no vested rights accrued and
the doctrine of economic benefit did not apply. The principal flaw
in Childs is that the court lost sight of who engaged the attorneys
and who was the principal obligor. Such an error affected the
courts analysis of the constructive receipt doctrine, the economic
benefit doctrine, and I.R.C. § 83.
In Childs, Garrett and Jones were principals and the attorneys
were agents. It is to the principals that the attorneys must look to
secure payment of their fees. Garrett's and Jones's only asset was
their claim against Columbus Gas. When the claims were settled,
Garrett and Jones released their claims in exchange for cash plus
promises of future payment by the Primary Insurer. They set aside
a portion of their rights to future payment for payment of attorneys' fees. Having set such funds aside, Garrett and Jones were
discharged from their obligation for attorneys' fees.23 4 Under
these circumstances, the economic benefit doctrine would require

tive to the requirement that the taxpayer is taxed only if he receives or constructively
receives income. See Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472, 1473 (9th Cir. 1985).
233 It is interesting that Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'k 45
T.C.M.(CCH) 398 (1982), a case allowing a taxpayer to defer receipt of sale proceeds
for seven days from one tax year to the next by use of an escrow arrangement determined before the final contract was signed, was not cited.
234 Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 93-36-001 (May 12, 1993) (recognizing that the relevant inquiry is
whether the assets set apart are subject to the creditors of the attorneys' clients). The
letter ruling states:
Thus, Revenue Ruling 77-420 illustrates that not all substantial forfeiture provisions will delay taxation; only those resulting in forfeiture to
the service recipient or its creditors ....
Applying the above principles
to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that Taxpayer's . . . rights to
payments under the annuity policies emanate from the legal services
that he performed for his clients, and that his clients have fully compensated him for his services by sharing their recoveries with him in accordance with their contingency fee, [sic] agreements. In effect, by
irrevocably directing the liability insurers to pay Taxpayer his portion of
their recoveries, Taxpayer's clients have funded their promises to share
those recoveries with him, and, in doing so, have conferred economic
benefits on him.
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the taxpayer to include the amount in income.2 3 5
Childs is a simple application of Drescher.23 6 In Drescher,an employer purchased an annuity for an employee and the court required the cost of the annuity to be included immediately in the
employee's income.2 3 7 In Childs, Garrett and Jones, like the employer in Drescher, merely purchased an annuity to compensate
their "employees," i.e. the attorneys. Unlike the Drescher court,
which did not mention the creditors of the company issuing the
annuity in its analysis, the Childs court found the existence of creditors with claims against the annuity a bar to inclusion of the annuity in the taxpayer's income. For purposes of determining whether
the cost of the annuity should be included in income, however, the
important creditors are those of the primary obligor.2 3 8 In Childs,
the primary obligors are Garrett and Jones. In Childs, Garrett and
Jones set aside assets for the benefit of the attorneys, which was the
hallmark of current taxability under the economic benefit
doctrine.
To avoid current taxation, the attorneys in Childs could merely
have agreed to look to Garrett and Jones to make the future payments. Since Garrett and Jones were not sophisticated in finance,
235 Scott notes that promises by third parties are included in income. See Scott,
supra note 6, at 29. He states:
An obligation of a third person to satisfy an employer's promise to pay is
a common form of a funded promise. The third person promise rule
usually involves insurance policies. An employee does not have income
if the policy is owned by the employer who promises a benefit to the
employee, because the asset is still subject to claims of creditors of the
employer. Claims cease to be a factor when the employer transfers the
policy to the employee. The employee will be deemed to receive income
from the insurance policy at the time of transfer.
Id. at 29-30 (footnotes omitted).
236 Citing Sproull Scott asserts that "[a]n obligation of a third person to satisfy an
employer's promise to pay is a common form of a funded promise." Scott, supra note
6, at 30 (footnotes omitted).
237 In discussing the application of the economic benefit doctrine to salary reduction plans in which the employer makes contributions to an insurance company for
an annuity, Metzer, supra note 36, at 572 states the following:
Without... special statutory provisions.., all annuity and life insurance premiums transferred to an insurer on behalf of a particular employee would generally be includible in his gross income on a current
basis. By analogy, all salary reduction payments transferred to a third
party trustee on behalf of a particular employee should be includible in
his gross income on a current basis, unless there is a specific statutory
exception.
238 The settlement agreements removed assets from the creditors of Garrett and
Jones. Their present or future creditors had no access to the funds used to pay the
attorneys' fees. As such, the promise cannot be considered an unfunded, unsecured
promise to pay in the future.
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however, they would have created too much risk for the attorneys.
In addition, providing a third-party promise as Garrett and Jones
did constitutes setting aside property,2" 9 which is equivalent to
purchasing an annuity under Drescher. As a result, the Tax Court in
Childs never considered Drescher and reached the wrong result.
Setting assets aside where the obligor (Garrett and Jones) has
relinquished all further claims also implicates the constructive receipt doctrine because the power to demand immediate payment
may be inferred. 24 0 During the negotiations in Childs, the attorneys
exercised considerable power to structure the settlement to meet
their needs. The attorneys separated their future payments from
those of their clients and split the law firm's claim for attorneys'
fees by allowing each partner to structure an individualized deferred compensation plan.
The inference that the attorneys had the power to demand
immediate payment is strengthened by the weakness of the reasons
given for the structured settlements. The objections to immediate
payment by Jones and the Primary Insurer seem contrived. The
Primary Insurer paid a significant sum to the Payment Obligor to
purchase the required annuities, which strongly suggests a willingness to make a current payment to the attorneys.2 41 Jones's insistence that the attorneys not be paid earlier than she or Garrett did
not prevent the attorneys from exercising broad discretion to determine their fees independent of the schedule of payments for
their clients. Further, Jones's structured settlement was necessitated by tax considerations unrelated to the attorneys' fees.24 2
See Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172; Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140.
Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 93-36-001 (May 12, 1993) (determining that the attorneys' fees
were included in the attorneys' income under the constructive receipt doctrine since
the fee arrangement was made after the taxpayers had performed substantially all of
the services and since the insurer was ready, willing, and able to pay cash immediately). In Childs, the court concluded that because the attorneys' fees were structured
and determined before the final settlement was reached, there was never a time when
the attorneys could demand payment. Accordingly, there was never a time when the
attorneys had constructive receipt of the fees. Childs, 103 T.C. at 654-55.
241 The Commissioner in Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 93-36-001 (May 12, 1993), found that constructive receipt occurred when an insurer agreed to settle the personal injury case
and pay a portion of the settlement proceeds to the attorneys on a structured basis.
242 See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (as amended in 1996). The section was amended in 1983
to make clear that the exclusion applied regardless of whether the damages are received in "lump sums or as periodic payments." The amendment was intended to
codify prior law so that amounts are excluded only if the taxpayer is "not in constructive receipt of, or does not have the current economic benefit of, the funds required
to produce the periodic payments." H.R. Rep. No. 832, 97th cong., 2d sess. 4 (1982)
(citing Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74; Rev. Rul 77-230, 1977-2 C.B. 214).
Frolik, supra note 83, at 574-83, argues that excluding periodic payments fosters
239
240
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Without a substantial non-tax purpose for the deferral, the deferral
should not be considered as resulting from a bona fide arm's
length agreement. It should be considered self-imposed and taxable under the constructive receipt doctrine.2 4 3
In Childs, the tax court answers all arguments by asserting,
first, that the parties reached the agreement prior to any amount
becoming payable to the attorneys and, second, that a mere guarantee does not constitute a securing of the obligation. 24 4 As already noted, the parties' prior agreement is irrelevant to the
economic benefit doctrine; the only other issues are whether the
rights are non-forfeitable and whether the assets are set apart from
the claims of the obligor's creditors. Both occurred in Childs.
Responding to the second assertion, it is noted that the Primary Insurer is not a guarantor of Garrett's andJones's obligations
to pay attorneys' fees. Rather, the Primary Insurer has become the
primary obligor and is holding the assets of Garrett and Jones to
pay the attorneys. Of course the Primary Insurer could have paid
the full amount of the settlement funds to Garrett and Jones. In
such case, Garrett and Jones would then have been personally oblihorizontal inequity. Frolik would repeal the amendment and allow the economic
benefit doctrine to determine when to report income. Under that approach, the
present value of the settlement would be reported in the year of settlement and the
interest component taxed separately either under I.R.C. § 72 (governing annuities),
I.RIC. § 1272 (governing original issue discount debt obligations), or under the open
transaction doctrine. See also Cooper, supra note 71, at 258 (discussing whether the
interest component of structured settlements must be reported under the economic
benefit doctrine).
243 The court in Oates v. Commissioner, in allowing a renegotiation of a commission
schedule, stated:
Here the parties were confronted by a situation where inconvenience
and resulting dissatisfaction came to the retired agents by reason of the
constantly decreasing payments made by the company under the original contract. To relieve the situation, the company and the taxpayer,
after full and complete negotiations, before retirement of the agent,
agreed to abrogate and annul the old contract, to substitute a new one
and thus to improve the unsatisfactory posture of affairs. The taxpayer ... took no dominion over the accrued commissions other than
to agree to receive them in cash installments as they matured under the
contract.
207 F.2d 711, 713-14 (7th Cir. 1953).
244 As stated in Child
It is well settled that a simple guarantee does not make a promise secured, since by definition a guarantee is merely itself a promise to pay.
Therefore, the mere fact that several insurance companies guaranteed
the payments to petitioners is irrelevant to our determination of
whether petitioners' right to receive the future payments was secured.
Commissioner v. Childs, 103 T.C. 634, 652 (1994), aff'd per curiam, 89 F.3d 356 (11 th
Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
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gated to pay the attorneys' fees. If the Primary Insurer actually
guaranteed such payment by Garrett and Jones, the Primary Insurer would have been a true guarantor and the Tax Court's holding would have been technically sound. In Childs, this is not the
case, and it would be unusual for tort settlements to provide that
the Primary Insurer would guarantee future payments to the injured party's attorney after discharging its obligation through disbursement of the entire recovery to the injured party.
Childs also implicates the cash equivalence doctrine and the
application of the Cowden standards to the annuities. While offered generally by insurance companies in commerce, annuities
are specific to the individual annuitant and even if salable, are not
liquid.2 4 5 Under a strict interpretation of either Cowden or Professor Gertzman's first alternative, the annuities in Childs do not raise
to the level of cash equivalence. On the other hand, Gertzman's
second alternative to Cowden, (i.e. whether the promise has a fair
market value), is too broad to be an effective test.246 A court might
look, however, to the substance of the transaction and conclude
that the attorneys could have realized sufficient value to require
reporting under a cash equivalence analysis.24 7
The Childs court's I.R.C. § 83 analysis is likewise flawed because it did not ask the question of who was the transferor. Therefore, the Childs court treated the Primary Insurer as if it had an
obligation to the attorneys for the services performed. That was
not the case. In fact, I.R.C. § 83 would apply because the annuity is
property under I.R.C. § 83 when used to fund the obligation of the
transferor. 248 The transferor under I.R.C. § 83 should have been
Garrett and Jones because they transferred their tort claims in exAccording to Scott, supra note 6, at 34:
One type of unfunded promise is included in an employment contract.
Because no market exists for employment contracts, the IRS has announced that receipt of this type of promise is not income. The IRS
position presumably will change should a market develop.
(footnotes omitted).
246 Id. at 35-36, notes the connection between fair market value and marketability
as follows:
Since a controlling factor is the practical ability to obtain payment, a
promise cannot be marketable unless it has a fair market value. Even if
the promise has substantial value, if that value is sufficiently uncertain to
make it inappropriately speculative, then the promise has no fair market value.
247 See Watson v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 1980).
248 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended 1985) providing: "The term [property]
also includes a beneficial interest in assets (including money) which are transferred
or set aside from the claims of creditors of the transferor, for example, in a trust or
escrow account."
245
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change for annuities, payable in part to their attorneys.2 49
Taken to its logical conclusion, Childs would permit an employee to say to his employer, "take my salary next year and buy me
an annuity to fund my private pension." Having pushed general
tax rules to their logical conclusion, either Congress, the Commissioner, or the courts need to restrain the excess. For example, a
judicial limitation on Childs could be a recognition of the economic benefit doctrine as a separate doctrine. Such a limitation is
consistent with and even demanded by general tax principles.
C.

The Economic Benefit Doctrine and General Tax Rules

Childs presses the limits of the constructive receipt and cash
equivalence doctrines and, in effect, eliminates the economic benefit doctrine. The taxpayers in Childs narrowly avoided application
of each of the doctrines thereby deferring income for periods as
short as a single tax year and as long as the lifetime of the taxpayer.
The economic benefit doctrine as applied in Example 4 of
Revenue Ruling 60-31 focuses on non-forfeitability and the setting
aside of assets. The economic benefit doctrine should recognize
that negotiations and agreements (or modifications thereof) deferring payment beyond the taxpayer's completion of performance
are irrelevant unless tied to substantial risks arising out of the transaction. If the promises are general, unfunded, or unsecured obligations of the obligor, the economic benefit doctrine would not
include such amounts in the taxpayer's income. These rules are
consistent with general tax principles.
1.

The Parties' Motivation

Taxpayers are permitted considerable latitude in structuring
transactions through arm's-length bargaining 5 ° and third-party ar249 In Commissioner v. Olmsted, the court recognized that taxable income would be
recognized by the beneficiary of an annuity where the employer transferred money to
an insurance company for the annuity. 304 F.2d 16, 22 (8th Cir. 1962). The court
accepted the argument that such an annuity was the equivalent of cash for tax purposes. See id.
250 As Judge Learned Hand stated in Helvering v. Gregoiy, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir.
1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935): "Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes
shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay
the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." The Supreme
Court agreed, stating: "The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what
otherwise would be his taxes or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted." Helvering, 293 U.S. at 465, 469; see also Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961) (noting a taxpayer's ability to minimize taxes).
But see Schlemmer v. United States, 94 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1938).
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rangements to defer payments to a cash-method taxpayer. Courts
are generally reluctant to examine the motivation of the parties to
such transactions. A limitation should be imposed, however, on
situations in which the third party has no interest in the timing of
payments and the risk of loss is minimized or where the taxpayer's
sole motivation is tax deferral. 2 5 '
Agreements arrived at through arm's length negotiations are
generally respected for tax purposes and the motivation of the parties in reaching the agreements are not found to be relevant. Arguments that the obligor was ready, willing, and able to pay cash
currently, have not been persuasive in the light of preexisting
agreements. 25 2 In the compensation area, long-standing principles
recognize that employees can defer compensation over a long period of time for pension purposes. Indeed, postponing taxation is
often the sole motive for deferred compensation agreements.
Does the parties' motivation have any relevance to the application
of the three doctrines? Are the taxpayers free to structure their
transactions for deferral purposes?
When the obligor has no interest in the outcome, the arm's
length character of the transaction is eliminated and the deferral
agreement should be viewed as "self-imposed." Unlike contract law
where the sufficiency of the consideration is unimportant, in tax
law sufficiency should be considered in economic terms. Unless
there is a "nexus" between the interest of the third party and the
deferral of payment, the deferral should be deemed "self-imposed"
by the taxpayer and ignored. A sufficient nexus exists for deferral
if the obligor's promise is unfunded and unsecured or leaves the
obligor free to use the funds.
Reed is an example where a purchaser of stock had no interest
in the escrow account to which the purchase price was deposited.
Applying a prior agreement to prevent constructive receipt resulted in an absurd result. 2 53 Where the obligor has completely
251 The Williams court stated:

We agree with the taxpayers' general proposition and have often declared, as other courts have, that the taxpayers may conduct their busi-

ness so as to minimize their taxes, provided only that the arrangements
are real, not sham arrangements, and are legally effective to accomplish
the desired result, and that, in determining whether the means used

are, or are not, effective, the fact that tax reduction is a moving cause in
the choice is not a material factor.
Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1955) (footnotes omitted).
252 See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. at 178; Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 93-36-001 (Sept. 10, 1993).
253 A technique used in the deferred compensation area is to transfer assets to a
trust outside the control of the transferor, but subject to the creditors of the trans-
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relinquished control over assets and has no further interest in their
disposition, a presumption should arise that the other party to the
transaction has, in fact, exercised the power to control the disposition of assets thus triggering the constructive receipt doctrine.
Taxpayer motivation also impacts the economic benefit doctrine. Under the economic benefit doctrine, negotiations leading
to a deferral arrangement are irrelevant because the focus is on the
economic benefit to the taxpayer. However, when assets are set
aside, the absence of a non-tax motive bolsters the conclusion that
the promised future payment is nonforfeitable and that funding
has occurred. In such situations, the taxpayer should have the burden to show a substantial non-tax purpose for the escrow (in Reed),
the establishment of insurance annuities (in Childs), or other genuine deferred arrangements.
Without a non-tax purpose, a deferred payment transaction
structured solely to minimize taxes does not defer income.25 4 The
"sham transaction" doctrine asks whether there is economic subferor. The Commissioner has conceded that the value of such assets would not be
included in income upon transfer to the trust. See Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428;
Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422. Employees benefit from the transfer because it
eliminates the possibility that the employer will later refuse to pay the amount. See
Scott, supra note 6, at 4-5, 10. Indeed, employees can often designate the investments
in which the trust will invest. See id. at 10-11.
254 See Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966) (denying interest
deductions to Irish Sweepstakes winner who structured borrowing and lending transaction to spread winnings over several years). Although the notes were not a sham,
the transaction's only purpose was securing a deduction and allowing a deduction
would "encourage transactions that have no economic utility and that would not be
engaged in but for the system of taxes imposed by Congress." Id. at 742. The court
stated:
[T]he interest deduction should be permitted whenever. .. the taxpayer's desire to secure an interest deduction is only one of mixed motives that prompts the taxpayer to borrow funds; or ...the deduction is
proper if there is some substance to the loan arrangement beyond the
taxpayer's desire to secure the deduction ....[A] taxpayer has the right
to decrease ... his taxes... by any means the law permits.... On the
other hand ... this provision should not ...permit an interest deduction when it appears that a taxpayer has borrowed funds in order to
engage in a transaction that has no substance or purpose aside from the
taxpayer's desire to obtain ... an interest deduction.
Id. at 741-42. (citation omitted); see also Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365
(1960) (denying interest deductions in sham transactions).
In Estate of Franklin,depreciation and interest deductions were denied where the
secured liability on property was significantly greater than the fair market value of the
property. Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976).
The court reasoned that depreciation is based on investment in property and interest
is based on the use or forbearance of money. See id. Neither condition existed under
the circumstances. See id.
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stance to the transaction other than the tax benefits. 25 5 For example, in Reed there was no purpose other than tax deferral and thus
the arrangement bordered on a sham transaction. At a minimum,
Reed demonstrates the absurd results of escrow arrangements that
have no purpose other than tax results.
In Childs, the primary if not the only purpose of the deferral
arrangement was to establish a private pension plan for the attorneys. 5 6 The tax deferral had significant and substantial economic
consequences. The tax benefits were: 1) the exclusion of the initial
value of the structured settlement and 2) the deferral of taxation
on the interest build-up over the years on the annuity. The taxpayers/attorneys established a pre-tax pension contribution without
complying with the provisions governing such investments (e.g.
U.S.C. § 401(k)).
2.

Step Transactions

The form chosen by the taxpayer for a transaction will generally govern the transaction. However, when the deferral is over an
extended period of time, the transaction in reality constitutes two
transactions. First, the immediate performance by the taxpayer for
a fee, and second, an investment decision by the taxpayer to take
an extended payment.
In Childs, not only was the primary obligor changed from the
tort victim to an insurance company, but the beneficiary of the obligation was changed from the law firm to the individual members
of the firm. The attorneys undoubtedly recognized that the Garrett and Jones settlement involved a sophisticated tax and investment decision under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)257 and so advised their
clients. Indeed a guardian was appointed for the minor Garrett
and in making the settlement decision the guardian was charged
with a high standard of care applicable to trustees. 2 58 To fulfill
such duty, the guardian analyzed the settlement offer and deter255 In Zeltzerman v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 73, 84, affd per curiam, 283 F.2d 514 (1st
Cir. 1960), the taxpayer sought deferral of income through an arrangement whereby
the hospital at which he performed services purchased annuities in lieu of paying
current compensation. Because the taxpayer had the option to receive either the
annuity certificates or cash, the arrangement lacked economic substance. Similarly,
Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d 810, 817 (Ct. Cl. 1978) found it bordered on a
sham.
256 The court's suggestion that such a structured result was demanded by the clients and Primary Insurer has already been shown to be contrived.
257 See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (1986); Frolik, supra note 83, at 573-74, 581-82.
258 Historically, the trustee was required to invest in conservative investments. With
the recent revisions of the trustee standard by the adoption of the new prudent inves-
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mined that it met the required standard of care.2 59
The attorneys made a similar two-step decision. First, they
sought counsel from the State Bar of Georgia to help them calculate their fees from Garrett and used present-value analysis to determine the fee. Second, all three attorneys made individual
investment decisions that left nothing to do but wait for the checks
to arrive. Clearly, if the attorneys agreed to payment of their fees
over an extended period, they undoubtedly would have considered
the investment quality of the obligation and concluded that the
payments were generally secure with a lifetime payout.
An insurance annuity is merely a conservative investment. Presumably the tax result in Childs would have been the same if the
settlement agreement provided that the periodic payments be determined by the return on a speculative mutual fund maintained
by the Primary Insurer. The fair market value of the Primary Insurer's obligation to the attorneys should be included in the taxpayer's income because this situation can be equated with one in
which the taxpayer first obtained cash and then invested the
amount in the particular investment. 260 Where the taxpayer accepts a deferred payment obligation for currently completed services and assets are set aside, the taxpayer has made a long-term
investment decision and the step-transaction approach should recognize that the taxpayer has received an economic or financial
benefit that should be currently reported.
3.

Guarantees

Having a transaction guaranteed by a third party generally
does not constitute security that will cause the obligor's promise to
be included in income. The principle should not apply where the
obligor's assets are in any way segregated to support the guarantee.
Further, when the obligor is a highly solvent organization or a regulated financial institution unrelated to the transaction, the
tor rule, trustees are required to follow current investment principles such as the
efficient market hypothesis elimination of unsystematic risk.
259 From the standpoint of investments, a regulated insurance company would be
considered a conservative investment; perhaps it would be the equivalent of cash in
economic terms. The important point is that the client's decision is really two decisions. First the decision to settle the tort case and second, the decision to invest the
proceeds over an extended period.
260 See GERTZMAN, supra note 20, at 3-17. Gertzman notes that if the instrument
could not be converted, inclusion would "impose unnecessary complexity and undue
hardship on the taxpayer or would be inconsistent with the use of the cash method."
Id.
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amount so guaranteed should be included in the taxpayer's
income.
Where the obligation to the taxpayer is guaranteed by a third
party, courts have held that such guarantees do not transform an
unfunded or unsecured obligation into a funded or secured obligation.26 1 Such a rule relieves the court of the obligation to evaluate
the economic realities of the guarantee.2 6 2 However, the rule
should not apply when, as in Childs, the guarantor is substituted for
the obligor.
Likewise, when the deferral is over a long term, additional limitations are necessary. While short-term obligations by solvent taxpayers (e.g., General Motors Corporation) are in reality often
equivalent to cash, they are not included in income to protect the
simplicity of the cash method of accounting. When the obligation
is long-term and the guarantor is solvent, however, tax law must
address the economic reality of the situation. Because the risk of
non-payment is eliminated by the third-party guarantees, the underlying policy of the economic benefit doctrine should include
the guaranteed amount in income. When long-term guarantees
are economically equivalent to the setting aside of assets and the
263
taxpayer's interest is no longer subject to the obligor's creditors,
the value of the obligation should be currently included in the taxpayer's income, unless some non-tax purpose is shown.
It may be noted that tax deferral is often the sole purpose of
many commonly recognized transactions such as deferred compensation plans.2 64 Further, the Commissioner has agreed with the
proposition that guarantees, even by third parties unrelated to the
261 See Berry v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 80 (N.D.N.C. 1984); see also Robinson v.
Commissioner, 420 T.C. 20, 37 (1965), acq. 1970-2 C.B. xxi (indicating that a guarantee by the obligor's parent did not constitute funding). But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-06-012
(Nov. 3, 1983) where the Internal Revenue Service ruled that:
under the economic benefit doctrine as it applies to surety arrangement, the current value of the protection provided ... constitutes an
economic benefit the cost of which is taxable to an employee if paid by
the employer, and thus held the employee taxable on the premiums
paid the surety, but not the amount secured.
262 See Temp. Reg. § 15A.453-1 (b) (3) (explaining that the term payment does not
include evidences of indebtedness regardless of whether it is guaranteed by a third
party (including a government agency)).
263 Bittker and Lokken, recognizing the benefits of simplicity in short-term obligations, state: "At the very least, cash basis employees with ordinary unsecured claims
against their employers for services rendered should not be taxed until the claim is
paid, even if it is an assignable chose in action and is virtually certain to be paid in due
course." BrTrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, at 105-50.
264 See Scott, supra note 6, at 13.
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transaction, do not constitute funding.2 65 These practices do not
undermine the proposal because the overriding principle is that
the economic benefit doctrine only includes amounts in income
when assets are set aside and are no longer subject to the obligor's
creditors. The long-term guarantee merely becomes the
equivalent of assets set aside. Childs, citing Minor, recognized this
principle and stated:
only at the time when the beneficiary obtains nonforfeitable
economic or financial benefits in the trust or insurance policy is
the provision for future payments secured or funded. However,
if the trust or policy is subject to the rights of general creditors
of the obligor, funding has not occurred.2 6 6
4.

Method of Accounting

Taxpayers are generally allowed to use their normal method
of accounting for tax purposes. I.R.C. § 446(b) sets out limits,
however, on the use of any method of accounting by giving the
Secretary the authority to challenge the method on the grounds
that it does not clearly reflect income. Under the clear reflection
of income doctrine, use of the cash method, which is often considered "less accurate than accrual accounting," 2 67 is subject to the
Commissioner's right to require a different method.2 6 8 The application of the clear reflection of income doctrine to the deduction
side of cash-method taxpayers is well-established.
In Sandor v. Commissioner,26 9 the Commissioner disallowed a
current interest deduction for five years of prepaid interest for a
cash-method taxpayer. 27" The Commissioner argued that the taxpayer's accounting did not "clearly reflect income." The Tax Court
had found that "the only reason the interest for the full five-year
period was prepaid in 1968 was to give the taxpayer the benefit of a
large deduction for interest in a year in which his income was quite
265 See id.
266 See Childs v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 634, 651 (1994), affid per curiam, 89 F.3d
356 (1th Cir. 1996) (citing Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985)).
267 See Brr-rKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, at 105-47.

268 I.R.C. § 446(b) states: "If no method of accounting has been regularly used by
the taxpayer or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation
of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income." I.R.C. § 446 (b) (1986).

See BrrrKER & LOKKEN,

supra note 21, at 105-47 to -48.
269 536 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1976).

270 See id. at 875. The taxpayer relied on I.R.C. § 163, which provides in part:
"There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable
year on indebtedness."
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high."2 7 1 The court stated, "[w] h i l e we recognize that a taxpayer
may decrease his taxes by means which the law permits ... we be-

lieve this right is subject to the right of the Commissioner under
[S]ection 446 to change the taxpayer's method of accounting with

respect to a material item in order to clearly reflect income."2 72

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding
that a deduction of the prepayment would materially distort income for 1968.
An exception to Sandor,known as the "one-year rule," allows a
taxpayer to deduct prepaid expenses where the period covered by
the prepayment is less than one year from the time of payment. 273
A similar exception could be developed on the income side where
the deferral results in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's
business.274
In Childs a clear distortion occurs on the income side. The law
firm undoubtedly deducted all general office expenses incurred in
operating the law office in the year, including the expenses of effectuating the Garrett and Jones settlements against income received during the year. Nevertheless, much of the income
generated during that year from the Garrett and Jones tort litigation was deferred over an extended period.
271 Sandor v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 469, 474 (1974), affd, 536 F.2d 874, 875 (9th
Cir. 1976).
272 Id. at 481.
273 Applying Treas. Reg. 1.461-1(a)(1) to prepaid rent, Zaninovich held that a taxpayer who paid rent on December 20, 1973, for the period from December 1, 1973
through November 30, 1974 was entitled to deduct the entire rental payment on his
1973 tax return. See Zaninovich v. Commissioner, 616 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1980).
The "one-year rule" distinguishes between currently deductible expenses and capital
expenditures having a useful life "substantially beyond" the close of the taxable year.
See id. at 432.
Compare Sandor with Commissioner v. Van Raden, in which the Commissioner determined that a deduction of prepaid cattle feed expense constituted a material distortion of income. See Commissioner v. Van Raden, 650 F.2d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir.
1981). The Van Radens invested in a limited partnership engaged in cattle feeding
December, 1972. See id. at 1047. The partnership purchased a one-year supply of
feed, none of which was consumed in 1972, and claimed a deduction for the purchase
on its 1972 return resulting in a net operating loss. See id. The Commissioner argued
that a 1972 deduction for feed consumed in 1973 and 1974 constituted a substantial
distortion of income. See id. The Tax Court used a similar analysis as Sandor,but used
the "one-year rule" to hold that the deduction did not result in a distortion of income.
See id. at 1050.
274 Under Rev. Rul. 82-208, 1982-2 C.B. 58, the Commissioner allowed a deduction
to cash basis taxpayers for prepaid state income taxes provided the amounts are reasonably determined in good faith. See also Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549 (allowing
accrual basis taxpayers to defer prepaid income for services to be performed in the
succeeding year until the next tax year).
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Long-term deferrals distort income, and thus should not be
permitted as deferral devices. 27 5 The argument that such a rule
would blur the difference between cash and accrual methods is not
persuasive. Earlier in this article, it was demonstrated that the difference is already blurred for income and expenses in accrualmethod accounting and for deductions in cash-method accounting.276 Further, the reason for applying the cash method (i.e. simplicity) is lost when the cash-method taxpayer enters complex
transactions that meticulously defer specific amounts over the taxpayer's lifetime. Ignoring such clear distortion of income solely to
maintain cash-method simplicity pushes the cash method of accounting beyond its natural limits.2 7 7
5.

Time-Value-of-Money Principles

Time-value-of-money principles have generally not been applied to income recognition by cash-basis taxpayers. In Ford Motor
275 In Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1969), the
court specifically noted the time between the receipt of payment for an aircraft and
the bond issued at the time of sale. The Mooney court stated:

In virtually all .

..

cases .

.

. there was still some relationship between

those funds and related expenses which, more or less proximately, had
to be borne. If there were no actual strings there were at least invisible
strings attached to the money. Taxpayers could not use the money without at least an eye to the upcoming expenses or services to be performed ....
pleases ....

For all practical purposes the revenue ... is his to use as he
In what sense, then, is it an accurate reflection of income

to regard it as an expense of doing business in the current year? To so
regard it is to let an accounting fiction obscure the business and fiscal
realities that are the heart of this case.
Id.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
According to Gertzman, if the existence of an ascertainable fair market value
were the test for inclusion under the cash method, the distinction between cash and
accrual methods of accounting would be virtually eliminated. Such a result would
cause cash-flow problems; burden the record-keeping capacity of individuals; eliminate the simplicity of the cash method; and lose the certainty of knowing when the
item is reported. Gertzman posits that intangible property "whose receipt is to be
excluded is that property whose character is such that it should not be deemed the
'equivalent of cash' and whose recognition should therefore be delayed until cash or
an equivalent of cash is ... received." GERTZMAN, supra note 20, at 3-14 to -15.
Under I.R.C. § 1001, gain is determined by the difference between the amount
realized and the taxpayer's basis in the property. The amount realized is the sum of
money realized plus the fair market value of any property received. For this purpose,
fair market value is the readily realizable market value. Therefore, the time for recognition is dependent on whether market value can be determined, not on the character or form of income received. See GERTZMAN, supra note 20, at 3-14. For a discussion
of this legislative development, see Report of Committee on Sales, Exchanges and
Basis, 31 TAx LAw 1481 (1978).
276
277
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Co. v. Commissioner,278 the Tax Court found that the taxpayer's deduction of the full value of future liabilities did not clearly reflect
income and instead applied time-value-of-money principles and
limited the deduction to the discounted present value of the future
liability.
Generally, courts have not generally applied time-value-ofmoney principles to determine the amount of income to include
or the amount of a deduction to allow for either cash- or accrualmethod taxpayers. Under the accrual method of tax accounting,
the timing of deductions is dependent on the "all-events" test, supplemented by the economic performance requirement. When a
deduction is allowed, however, the full amount of the liability is
deducted without discount. The continued validity of this rule became questionable when the Tax Court decided Ford Motor Co.279
In Ford Motor Co., for the first time, the Tax Court denied a
deduction for the full amount of a future obligation, but allowed a
current deduction for what was the practical equivalent of the discounted present value of such future obligation. The result rested
on the Commissioner's authority, under I.R.C. § 446(b), to designate an accounting method that "clearly reflects income."
In 1980, Ford reached settlements in a number of personal
injury and wrongful death claims that required Ford to pay the
claimants fixed amounts periodically for up to fifty-eight years. In
total, Ford agreed to pay approximately $24.5 million to the claimants. 2 0 Ford then purchased annuities to cover the payments at a
premium cost of $4.5 million. Ford maintained ownership of the
annuities and continued to be liable to the claimants for the full
amount of the payments. 28 1 Claiming the requirements of the "allevents" test had been met, Ford sought to deduct the entire $24.5
2 2
million obligation in the year of settlement.
The Commissioner challenged the deduction, arguing that
Ford's accrual method of accounting did not clearly reflect income 2 83 and limited Ford to a deduction equal to the cost of the
annuities (i.e. $4.5 million). Finding that the Commissioner had
not abused his discretion under I.R.C. § 446(b),2 8 4 the Tax Court
102 T.C. 87 (1994), affd, 71 F.3d 209 (6th Cir. 1995).
See id. For an in-depth analysis of the opinion in Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner,
see Gordon Butler, supra note 26.
280 See Ford Motor Co., 102 T.C. at 89.
278
279

281

See id.

282
283

See id. at 90.
See I.R.C. § 446(b) (1988).
See Ford Motor Co., 102 T.C. at 91. As noted by Raby:

284
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held that the Commissioner's determination was supported by the
facts.2 85 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that Ford's result would
extend "the accrual method of accounting beyond its inherent
limitations. "286
By limiting Ford Motor Co's. deduction to the cost of the annuity that represented the discounted present value of the payments
to be made to the tort claimants, the court accepted the method
used by Ford Motor Co. to calculate the expense under financial accounting standards. 28 7 Affirming this remedy the Sixth Circuit
stated:
While we recognize that to require Ford to account for its tort
obligations on the cash method might have been a more logical
alternative, we cannot find that the Commissioner's exercise of
her discretion was arbitrary because it resulted in an accounting
treatment more favorable to Ford than a straight cash method
The IRS determination is not merely presumptively correct; rather, it
will only be set aside if it is an abuse of discretion. But what is the standard to be used in deciding whether the IRS has abused its discretion in
holding that a method does not clearly reflect income. Ah, there's the
rub. If Congress had known what clearly reflected income, it probably
would have said so.
William L. Raby, Tax Practiceand Accounting News: Raby says that Tax Court's Decision in
Ford May Destabilize Tax Accounting, 62 TAx NoTEs 1169, 1169 (1994). See Lucas v.
American Code, 280 U.S. 445. 449 (1930).
285 See Ford Motor Co, 102 T.C. at 96. The Hallmark court stated:
Respondent's broad authority to determine whether a taxpayer's accounting method clearly reflects income is limited, in that he may not
reject, as not providing a clear reflection of income, a method of accounting employed by the taxpayer which is specifically authorized in
the Code or regulations and has been applied on a consistent basis.
Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 26, 31 (1988). Hallmark was distinguished in Ford Motor Co. on the basis that the statement should not be interpreted
broadly because the Hallmark court only addressed the question of whether the all
events test had been met for the accrual of income by the taxpayer that had not been
met.
286 71 F.3d at 215.
287 The Court essentially adopted the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) treatment used by Ford for financial accounting purposes. In the past, tax
law followed GAAP more closely than it does today. On the relationship between tax
accounting rules (i.e. that accounting dearly reflect income) and GAAP, the classic
statement is found in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979), which
states:
The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful information to management, shareholders, creditors, and others properly interested; the major responsibility of the accountant is to protect these
parties from being misled. The primary goal of the income tax system,
in contrast, is the equitable collection of revenue; the major responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service is to protect the public fisc [sic].
Id. at 542-43 (citations omitted).
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Ford Motor Co. demonstrates that deferrals over significant periods may distort income and press an accounting method beyond
its "inherent limits." The appropriate remedy seems to apply the
time-value-of-money principles. These principles should be applied to Childs and the discounted present value of the payments to
be received by the attorneys should be reported in the year of
settlement.
6.

Tax Symmetry

To prevent abuse of tax deferral devices, tax law often defers
deductions by one party to a transaction until income is recognized
by the other party. The attorneys in Childs wanted to establish a
pension-like benefit in which the contribution was immediately deductible (or not included in income) and the investment appreciation was not taxed until distribution. When dealing with nonqualified pension plans and I.R.C. § 83 transfers, the transferor is
denied a deduction until the funds are included in the income of
the recipient taxpayer." 9 This balance2 9 ° is self-policing because
the tax loss caused by virtue of not taxing the recipient currently is
offset by denying a current deduction. Such symmetry enters the
negotiation process because one party wants to defer income while
the other desires a current deduction.
No such rules limit the use of the cash method of tax account71 F.3d at 217.
See I.R.C. § 83 (h) (1986) providing: "In the case of a transfer of property to
which this section applies... there shall be allowed as a deduction under section 162,
to the person for whom were performed services. . . an amount equal to the amount
included ...in gross income of the person who performed such services ....
" Moreover, MCDANIEL, supra note 56, at 980, notes that Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 Cum. Bull.
174, accepts the principle that there is no constructive receipt when an employee
receives unfunded, nonforfeitable rights to deferred compensation even though the
employer would have been willing to pay cash immediately and the deferral arrangement had no independent business purpose beyond the deferral of the payments.
Unfunded, deferred-compensation plans are governed by the constructive receipt doctrine. See Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428 (describing the conditions when
the IRS will issue advance rulings regarding the application of the constructive receipt
doctrine to unfunded deferred compensation plans). Funded, nonqualified plans
(unfunded plans are nonqualified), historically governed by the economic benefit
doctrine, are covered by I.R.C. § 402(b) (1), which provides that payments to employee trusts are covered by I.RC. § 83, thereby achieving substantially the same results as under the economic benefit doctrine. See Scott, supra note 6, at 2-3 for a
general discussion of the tax attributes of non-qualified plans.
290 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (as amended in 1988) (delaying deductions between related parties); I.R.C. §§ 1274, 163(e) (1986) (providing income recognition and deduction of interest on debt instruments having original issue discount).
288
289
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ing and where they do, the effect is erratic." t I.R.C. § 404(a),
which imposes an income/deduction balance on non-qualified deferred payment plans,292 applies to employer contributions that
amount to a plan, 293 including payments to independent contractors.2 94 Such a balance does not apply to personal injury settlements because under I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) tort plaintiffs do not
include the recovery in income, and thus are not concerned about
the deduction for attorneys' fees.29 5
In some cases, however, tort plaintiffs could experience some
unexpected and diverse tax results from long-term deferrals. In
the case of non-physical injuries, the portion of the recovery for
punitive damages is not excludable to the plaintiff.29 6 For example, if a taxpayer/plaintiff obtains a $1 million settlement representing $100,000 (10% of $1 million) in compensatory damages
and $900,000 (90% of $1 million) in punitive damages, the
$900,000 is taxable. If, of the $1 million received by the taxpayer,
he pays his attorney a fee of $400,000 (40% of $1 million), what are
the tax consequences? The taxpayer includes $900,000 in income
and under I.R.C. § 212 the taxpayer would take a deduction of
See GRAETz & SCHENK, supra note 31, at 813.
See I.R.C. § 404(d)(1) (1986). Rev. Rul. 88-68, 1988-2 C.B. 117, held that a service recipient who agrees to pay an independent contractor a fee for certain services
performed by the independent contractor over a four-year period could only deduct
the fees as the independent contractor included them in income. The ruling held
that
[service recipient's] agreement with [the independent contractor] is a
method or arrangement of compensation that has the effect of a plan
deferring the receipt of compensation, because under the agreement
[the independent contractor] is to receive some of the compensation
more than a brief period of time after the end of [service provider's]
taxable year in which the services creating the right to the compensation were performed.
Id.
293 See I.R.C. § 404(a) (5) (as amended in 1987), which provides:
If contributions are paid by an employer to or under... a plan deferring the receipt of such compensation, such contributions or compensation shall not be deductible under this chapter; but, if they would
otherwise be deductible, they shall be deductible under this section,
subject, however, to the following limitations as to the amounts deductible in any year: ...
(5) [I]f the plan is not [a qualified plan], in the taxable year in which
an amount attributable to the contribution is includible in the gross
income of employees participating in the plan ....
294 See I.R.C. § 404(d) (1986).
295 See I.R.C. § 265 (1986).
296 I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (1996) was amended in 1996 to limit the exclusion to physical personal injuries and deny the exclusion for any punitive damages. See The Small
Business Job Protection Act, P.L. 104-188 § 1605.
291
292
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$360,000 (90% of $400,000) representing the expenses of producing "taxable" income. The deduction is below the line2 9 and subject to the 2% floor for miscellaneous deductions, 29 8 phaseouts on
itemized deductions and personal exemptions, 29 9 and the limitation of the standard deduction. 300 The result is an itemized deduction for attorney fees of approximately $318,000301 and
phaseout of the personal exemption.
Modifying the example, assume the attorneys take their fee up
front and the taxpayer accepts a twenty year structured settlement
beginning the 'following year. In the year of settlement the taxpayer receives $400,000, which he pays his attorneys. Of this
$400,000, the taxpayer includes $360,000 in income representing
the punitive damage portion. The taxpayer would take a $360,000
deduction subject to the below-the-line limitations unless he is
forced to capitalize the deduction and amortize it over twenty years
in proportion to the recovery.30 2 In the latter case, the taxpayer
could, subject to limitations, deduct $144,000 (40% of $360,000) in
the year of settlement and $21,600 (1/20th of 60% of $360,000) in
each of the twenty years. In the year of settlement, the taxpayer
would have taxable income of $229,000 and a tax of $72,212303
without any apparent means of paying the tax currently.
Finally, if the taxpayer accepts a $600,000 lump sum settlement and the attorney defers his $400,000 fee for twenty-five years
until his sixty-fifth birthday, the taxpayer would have gross income
of $540,000 (90% of $600,000) in the year of settlement but no
deduction for attorneys' fees. Investing the attorneys' fees at 8%,
the insurance company would pay the attorney approximately $2.7
million in twenty-five years. The taxpayer/plaintiff would include
$2.43 million (90%) in his income and take an itemized deduction
See I.R.C. § 62 (1993).
See I.R.C. § 67 (1993).
See I.R.C. §§ 68, 151(d) (3)(1993).
300 See I.R.C. § 63 (1993).
301 The $360,000 deduction is reduced by $18,000 (2% of Adjusted Gross Income
(AGI) of $900,000 under I.R.C. § 67) by $24,000 (3% of AGI less threshold of
$100,000 for phaseout of itemized deduction under I.RC. § 68).
302 See INDOPCO v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 90 (1992) (holding that investment banking, legal, and other costs incurred 'in connection with the acquisition of
another company were not deductible currently under I.R.C. § 162 and must be capitalized because the expenditures resulted in future benefits).
303 Gross income (and adjusted gross income) of $360,000 with an itemized deduction of $144,000 less $7200 (2% of $360,000 under I.RC. § 67) and less $7800 (3% of
$360,000 less $100,000 under I.R.C. § 68) and loss of the personal exemption (I.R.C.
§ 151). The taxpayer's taxable income would be $231,000. Under 1995 rates, the tax
on this amount would be $72,212. Inflation adjustment on phaseouts is ignored.
297
298
299
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under I.R.C. § 212 of approximately $2.31 million. The result
would be taxable income of $119,000 to the taxpayer that he may
3 4
not want to recognize. 0
The issues raised by the foregoing hypothetical would not affect Garrett or Jones in Childs because the entire settlement
amount was excluded under I.R.C. § 104(a) (2). The example does
demonstrate the problem of allowing extended deferral arrangements under the cash method of tax accounting. Applying the economic benefit doctrine would force the parties to address the
attorneys' tax issue as part of the structured settlement negotiations. 30 5 It would recognize that taxation of the attorneys' fees is
appropriate upon the completion of services.
7.

Illiquidity of Taxpayer

In determining the appropriate time to tax a transaction, the
availability of funds to pay the tax is often a consideration. Such
consideration is only applicable to transactions through specific
Code sections. In numerous situations the unavailability of funds
makes current taxation of income inappropriate. The whole
gamut of non-recognition rules provide a background for when
taxability is not administratively desirable. Such situations generally reflect important policy reasons and not that current taxation
of such transactions is prohibited. For example, income from
abandoned leasehold improvements could be taxed currently even
though the taxpayer does not have funds available to discharge the
tax. Congress enacted I.R.C. §§ 109 and 1019, however, to defer
income recognition on the value of abandoned leasehold improvements until the underlying assets are sold."°6
Deferral is a tax-policy consideration. There is no reason attorneys handling personal injury settlements should be allowed extended deferrals of income. The motivating force behind
structured settlements in the tort area is the exclusion of personal
injury recoveries from gross income under I.R.C. § 104(a) (2).
Congress has seen fit to make this exclusion broadly available, but
has not extended its benefit to the attorneys assisting in the structuring of settlements. Moreover, exclusions should be narrowly ap304 Gross income (and adjusted gross income of $2.43 million) with an itemized
deduction of $2.43 million less $48, 600 (2% of $2.43 million under I.R.C. § 68) and
less $69,900 (3% of 2.43 million less $100,000 under I.RC. § 68) and loss of personal
exemption (I.R.C. § 151). The taxpayer's taxable income would be $119,000.
305 By virtue of I.R.C. § 104(a) (2), tax consequences should be a topic of discussion
in any tort claim involving personal injury. See Frolik, supra note 83, at 582.
306 See I.R.C. §§ 453, 1031, 1033, 1034 (1986).
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plied. Therefore, even if the amount and timing of the attorney's
fees were determined solely by amounts to be received by the tort
plaintiff, the attorneys should be taxed currently, particularly if
their interest is set apart from that of the tort plaintiff. The settlement reflects the realities of I.R.C. § 104(a) (2), and should also
take into account the realities of cash-method accounting and the
recognition of current income. If attorneys or other cash-method
taxpayers desire further methods of long-term deferral, it should
be accomplished through legislation and not the courts.
III.

CONCLUSION

This article has explored the three doctrines used to restrain
abuse of the cash method of accounting for income. It has shown
how two traditional doctrines, constructive receipt and cash equivalence, are relatively well-defined when confined to their natural
limits. Because they are relatively narrow and technical, however,
they cannot apply to certain areas. When courts attempt to expand these doctrines beyond their natural limits to prevent abuses,
considerable confusion results and it becomes unclear which doctrine is being applied. This article has shown that the economic
benefit doctrine is often ignored as a separate and distinct doctrine
with the result that unwarranted deferral is frequently obtained, as
demonstrated in Reed and Childs.
To prevent abuse and confusion, this article has advocated the
recognition of the economic benefit doctrine as a separate doctrine. As set forth in Example 4 of Revenue Rule 60-31, °7 the salient features of the doctrine are that the rights to payment must be
nonforfeitable and that something of value must be set aside to
fund or secure the nonforfeitable rights. In determining whether
something of value is set aside, the question focuses on whether
the assets that will be used to pay the obligation are fully subject to
the creditors of the obligor. Further, agreements to defer between
the taxpayer and the obligor are irrelevant if the conditions of the
economic benefit doctrine are satisfied.
The recent case of Childs involved taxpayers who took extreme
liberty in structuring the receipt of fees in personal injury litigation. The economic benefit doctrine, rightly defined, forces the
attorneys to recognize their fees in income at the time the personal
injury claim is settled and the fees are earned. The amount of the
income should be based on the present value of the future pay307

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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ments. Any amount received in future years by the taxpayer in excess of the amount included in income should be considered the
result of the taxpayer's individual investment decision.
Support for this approach has been found in the case of Ford
Motor Co. which for the first time applied time-value-of-money principles to situations in which the Commissioner argued that the taxpayer's accounting method did not clearly reflect income. By
pursuing the analysis suggested herein, some of the pitfalls of the
three doctrines applicable to receipt of income by cash-method
taxpayers will be eliminated.
Finally, this article has demonstrated that applying the economic benefit doctrine as a separate doctrine is consistent with the
economic reality of the situation. Such approach accurately reflects the motivation of the parties and is consistent with longstanding tax rules such as the step-transaction doctrine, the use of
guarantees, taxpayer freedom in determining accounting method,
principles of tax symmetry, and consideration of taxpayer
illiquidity.
IV.

APPENDIX

Exhibit A

Attorney and
Payment Schedule
Mr. Philips:
1987 (Jan)
1988 (Jan)
Mr. Childs:

1987-1996
1996-1999 (Aug)
Mr. Swearingen:

Attorney Fees
Under the
Garrett Release
Agreement 30 8

Present Value at
6% (Jan. 1, 1987)

52,155

52,155

52,155

49,201

1,324/ mo.
6,000/ yr.

119,257
11,609

1987-1992 (Jan)

11,734/ yr.

37,694

1992-1993-1994 (Aug)
1995 (Aug)
1996-1997 (Aug)
1998 (Aug)

10,000/ yr.
20,000
10,000/ yr.
22,000

19,974
11,168
10,237
10,933

1999-2000-2001 (Aug)
Present value of attorneys' fees:

12,000/ yr.

14,101
336,329

308 The payments to be made to Attorneys Childs, Phillips, and Swearingen under
the Garrett Settlement are described in Childs v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 634, 642
(1994), affd per curiam, 89 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Attorney and
payment schedule
Mr. Philips (b. 1949):
(life expect: 43.5 yrs)
1992-life (Jan)
*(3% compounded annually)
Mr. Childs (b. 1946):
(life expect: 40.26 yrs)
1988 (Jan)
1988 (Apr)
Mr. Swearingen
(b. 1943)
(life expect: 37.7 yrs)
1988-92
1997-2001
2002-06
2007-11
2112-life
Present value of attorneys' fees:

Exhibit B
Attorneys' fees
under the
Jones Release
Agreement 3 09

$1,000/mo.*

49,000
49,050

1,000/mo.
1,200/mo.
1,400/mo.
1,600/mo.
1,800/mo.

Present Value at
6% (Jan. 1, 1988)

$132,233

48,877
48,315

51,725
34,624
30,216
25,805
46,934
418,729310

309 For a description of the payments to be made to Attorneys Childs, Phillips, and
Swearingen under the Jones Settlement, see Childs, 103 T.C. at 645-46.
310 The case suggests that the insurance carrier paid a total of $536,069 for the
'Jones annuities." It is unclear whether this amount represents payment solely for the
annuities for the attorneys or includes the cost of the annuity for Mrs.Jones. See id. at
647.

